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PREFACE 
This study is concerned with obtaining the attitudes of 
television broadcast news editors and attorneys (both 
defense and prosecutors) towards the electronic coverage of 
courtroom proceedings. The primary objective is to 
highlight important issues in the controversy as perceived 
by selected Oklahoma broadcast journalists and attorneys. 
I wish to express my deeply felt appreciation to my 
thesis adviser, Dr. William R. Steng for his excellent 
guidance and assistance throughout this study and during my 
time in the undergraduate and graduate programs. 
I would also like to express my sincere appreciation 
and heartfelt gratitude to Dr. Walter J. Ward my academic 
and major adviser who has not only been an excellent adviser 
but an outstanding teacher and leader who guided me 
throughout my duration of study in this university with 
knowledge and understanding. 
Appreciation is also expressed to Dr. Philip E. Paulin 
who first planted the seed for this study in my mind and for 
his invaluable assistance and thoughtful suggestions during 
the course of this study and during my time in the 
undergraduate program. Without the assistance and help of 
these men, this study would not have been possible. 
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An anonymous note of thanks is offered to the 59 
respondents who freely gave of their time to participate in 
this study. 
At this point I would like to acknowledge the love, 
support, invaluable help, and understanding nature of my 
wife, Folake, who made it all possible during this study and 
throughout our student life at Oklahoma State University. 
To say that she has worked hard and persevered in the 
various difficult times of our stay here is to put it 
mildly. Follybabe, you are just wonderful and more than a 
wife to me. This same appreciation goes to our children, 
Fela and Jinmi, who innocently bore the pain and discomfort 
of our student life. I pray that we all live long to reap 
and enjoy the fruits of our labour and many happy days 
ahead. 
Expressions of appreciation and notes of thanks will 
not suffice without a mention of my mother, Charlotte Koko 
Quartey to whom I dedicate this study. She made it all come 
true for me in the United States of America with her 
financial assistance, prayers and blessings. 
Finally, the same love and gratitude go to my father, 
Samuel Ogunduyile, and all my brothers and sisters for their 
understanding encouragement and sacrifices. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The term "electronic news gathering devices" and ''elec-
tronic media" means the use of television film and video 
cameras, still photography cameras, tape recording devices, 
microphones, and radio broadcast equipment. 
It is this equipment which traditionally has been 
banned from courtrooms as early as 1917. The Illinois 
supreme court in a 1917 decision advised state and other 
courts against permitting the use of still or newsreel 
photography in their courtrooms. 1 
By 1937, virtually every federal and state court had 
banned coverage of proceedings with electronic news 
gathering devices.2 
Since virtually all judicial debate has centered around 
the use of cameras in the courtroom rather than radio 
broadcast pickup, many sources, like the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Estes V. Texas, discuss the ban on electronic news-
gathering devices in terms of "The camera ban", "camera in 
court", "television in courts", "courtroom cameras", "camera 
coverage", while at the same time including radio.3 The use 
of such terms in this paper should be understood to include 
all electronic newsgathering devices. 
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Though Canon 35, now known as Canon 3A (7), of the 
American Bar Association's (ABA's) Code of Judicial Ethics 
remains, the number of states permitting electronic coverage 
of judicial proceedings has been increasing. As of the end 
of 1978, there were approximately 20 states allowing elec-
tronic equipment and cameras in their courtrooms.4 
By 1982, the Radio/Television News Directors 
Association counts 38 states that allow televised or elec-
tronic news coverage of courtroom proceedings on either a 
permanent or experimental basis, though often under severe 
restriction.5 (See Appendix C for chart showing State-by-
State Summary of Court Rules or Statutes Allowing Broadcast 
Coverage of Court Proceedings). This study reviews the 
status of cameras in courts before 1935, traces the steps 
after Canon 35, focusing on issues, conflicts, and develop-
ments surrounding use of cameras in the courts, and reviews 
cases representative of the conflict. 
Freedom of expression is the continuation and practical 
manifestation of freedom of thought. It is one of the most 
fundamental human rights. The media contend it should not 
be denied nor trampled upon. In the United State press 
freedom is woven into the social and political fabric and 
continues to be one of the mainsprings of its democracy. 
The founding fathers incorporated the right to a free media 
into the Constitution. 
The First Amendment says that: Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; 
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
an~ to peti~ion the government for a redress of 
grievances. 
Justice Hugo Black in Bridges V. California in 1941 
wrote, "Free speech and fair trials are two of the most 
cherished policies of our civilization, and it would be a 
trying task to choose between them. 11 7 Merrill, Bryon, and 
Alisky in a study of 86 national constitutions found that 
the principle of such freedom is set forth more or less 
explicitly in every social covenant, regardless of the 
political system it establishes.8 Nevertheless, throughout 
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the world, regardless of what type of media system a country 
may accept, the right to publish and to broadcast the truth 
is either denied or under constant attack. The complex 
nature of gathering, publishing, and disseminating news is 
such that the media is constantly brought into conflict with 
the government or the Law of the Land. In addition, because 
of the pervasive role of government in determining the 
destinies of men, the media is increasingly dependent on 
government for a major portion of its news.9 
Trial by jury has been the norm since the time of the 
colonists and has been affirmed in the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments. The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment 
requires that care be taken in all federal courts to 
preserve the rudiments of fair play in trial procedures. 
The Sixth amendment guarantees that: In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impar-
tial jury of the state and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district 
shall have been previously ascertained by Law, and 
to be informed of the nature and the cause of the 
accusation: to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him: to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and rs have the 
assistance of counsel for his defense. 
Former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts 
described the aims and effects of the Sixth Amendment: "It 
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is not that a just result shall have been obtained, but that 
the result, whatever it be, shall be reached in a fair 
way».11 
History has shown that the rights to a free media and 
fair trial have been in perennial confict. This sometimes 
has wrecked the chances of a fair trial or an impartial 
verdict by the jury. The media dissemination of inflamma-
tory details and biased reports about the suspect before he 
is brought to trial, can overwhelm and destroy an individu-
al's right to a fair trial. 
Typical examples are statements by over zealous or 
publicity-seeking officials as to alleged confessions and 
incriminating evidence which in effect make the case "open 
and shut." Such information receives intensive and perva-
sive publicity when there is widespread interest in the 
crime or in the identity of the victims or the accused. The 
conflict dates as far back as 1878 to a case in the State of 
Utah. A defendant petitioned the United States Supreme 
Court to reverse his bigamy conviction because the judge 
seated jurors who admitted they had read about the case. At 
the present time the problem has been complicated by radio 
and television, with the latter occupying a place of 
unprecedented influence in the homes of most citizens. 
Lewis Powell, a Supreme Court Justice, wrote: 
There can be no doubt that the intense pretrial 
publicity which modern technology makes possible 
can be gravely prejudicial. The impact of these 
news media and the power for good or evil which 
those who control them possess would have 
astounded the Framers of our constitution, who 
lived in a world of hand press and limited 
literacy. 12 
History: The Story Behind the Adoption 
of the Ban on Courtroom Cameras 
The use of modern electronic news gathering equipment 
like microphones, radio, tape recorders, still cameras and 
television in courtroom proceedings has been attacked con-
stantly by some judges and local bar associations as a 
threat to the decorum and dignity of the court. Decisions 
prohibiting its use were made as early as 1917. 13 The 
Illinois Supreme Court took the opportunity in a 1917 
decision to advise state courts against permitting still or 
newsreel photography. 14 
After World War I, news photography blossomed from the 
stimulus of a growing number of tabloid newspapers, and by 
the mid 1920's, courtroom photographs had become a regular 
feature of most daily news, especially the New York DailX 
News, a pace setter among the picture-laden tabloids. 15 
Lawyers and journalists who gathered to discuss mutual 
professional problems in the 1920's often put cameras in 
court at the top of their list. For example, when the 
Chicago Bar Association tackled free press-fair trial 
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problems the first palliative recommendation made by its 
Committee on Relations of the Press to Judicial Proceedings 
was the exclusion of cameras from the court.16 However, 
this did not stop full media coverage of the Loeb-Leopold 
6 
murder trial in 1924 and the Scopes evolution trials in 1925 
which were recorded and broadcast over the radio. 17 
In 1925, at the urging of the Chicago Bar Association, 
46 judges voted unanimously to prohibit photography in and 
around the courtroom during and when proceedings were 
pending. 18 But the rules limiting courtroom photography 
virtually failed because they were not uniformly imposed. 
Competition among newspapers impelled all to attempt to take 
trial pictures. Likewise, judges found it difficult to 
uphold the prohibition when their colleagues allowed un-
limited picture taking. 19 The media, in total rejection of 
the rules, argued that it was beyond the judiciary's 
boundary to determine what should be printed and how it 
should be done. The media contended the ban also would 
impede coverage of the entire legal system. 20 
The American Judicature Society, which represented the 
sentiments of most judges and lawyers, dismissed the press 
objections to the Chicago rule: 
We submit that such pictures are no part of 
genuine judicial publicity. They tell nothing of 
the trial whatsoever. They merely flatter certain 
officials and individuals or cater t~ 1 a morbid and 
moron interest in sensational crime. 
The first ruling banning cameras in courtrooms was 
handed down in 1927 by Judge Eugene O'Dunne against Hearst's 
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Baltimore News and the morning American.22 Judge O'Dunne, 
presiding at a murder trial, caught a news photographer, 
William Klemm, taking pictures of the defendant being locked 
in the courthouse jail. The judge decided to prohibit 
photography in the courtroom and its precincts.23 
But a city editor who knew of the order instructed 
another News photographer, William Strum, to take pictures 
which later were published in the evening News and the 
morning American.24 Judge O'Dunne began contempt proceed-
ings against the two photographers, the city editor of the 
News and the managing editors of both newspapers.25 The 
managing editor of the News admitted the pictures were taken 
in violation of the court order but contended the court had 
no right to forbid the taking of pictures in the court.26 
In effect, the Hearst papers acknowledged the judge's 
authority to stipulate the conditions under which photo-
graphs could be taken, but asserted that he could not 
prohibit photography entirely. 
The Maryland Court of Appeals ruled the publishers had 
flouted a direct judicial order and that a presiding judge 
could regulate and even prohibit disruptive conduct for the 
two-fold purpose of protecting the rights of the defendant 
(who was in custody of the court) and preserving the dignity 
of judicial proceedings.27 The Hearst newspapers lost their 
appeal of the contempt citiation and paid a $5,000 fine. 
The five editors and the photographers were sentenced to one 
day in jai1.28 Once Judge O'Dunne's prohibition was 
affirmed, other judges issued "standing orders barring 
newspaper photographers" from court proceedings. This was 
fully supported and endorsed by members of the bar. 29 
Before Canon 35 came into existence, the essence and 
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the importance of news photography was a reality to publish-
ers who had to stay at the top of the market. This created 
a dilemma for photojournalists covering court proceedings. 
They were faced with a patchwork of differing judicial 
stances. Jurisdictions such as Chicago prohibited all 
photographic coverage of court proceedings; in some juris-
dictions instructions were tailored to particular cases and 
in other jurisdictions judges welcomed photographic coverage 
of the courts with few reservations.30 A typical example 
was a judge in a 1931 murder trial who dismissed a juror's 
complaint that picture taking interfered with his concentra-
tion saying, "The safety of the administration of the 
criminal law is publicity. 11 31 
In a 1933 kidnapping trial in Oklahoma City a judge who 
permitted photographers and cameras into his courtroom said: 
We are living in an age of pictures when people 
get their information from seeing as much as 
reading . . . . The courts belong to the people. 
Only a few of them can get inside the courtroom 
and the constitution says 2our trials shall be open 
and above board for all.j 
Discussions of the free press-fair trial problems led 
to the creation in 1924 of the American Bar Association 
(ABA) Committee on Cooperation between the Press and the 
Bar.33 
The ABA committee helped establish local press-bar 
panels and tried to promote a better relationship between 
the press and members 6f the bar.3 4 
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The peaceful relationship remained until the tumultuous 
trial of Bruno Richard Hauptmann in 1935. This led the ABA 
to impose upon the media the Canons of Professional and 
Jusicial Ethics, including Canon 35.35 
Although there were indications that members of the ABA 
expressed concern about effects of still cameras in the 
courtrooms as early as 1932 they did not study the problem 
until after the Hauptmann trial.36 
"The Lindberg Case" and trial of "Bruno Hauptmann" 
refer to the kidnapping in 1932 of the 19-month-old son of 
the famous aviator who made the first solo crossing of the 
Atlantic.37 Intense photographic coverage of the kidnapping 
began immediately after Charles A. Lindberg reported the 
disappearance of his son. Shortly thereafter the body of 
Charles Jr. was found in a shallow grave near the Lindberg 
home.38 As police investigated the kidnapping-murder during 
the next two years the press, especially photographers, 
hounded Lindberg and his wife.39 
On September 1934, Bruno Richard Hauptmann, a German 
immigrant, was arrested for the crime. His subsequent trial 
which started in January 1935 attracted more than 700 
writers and broadcasters and 132 still and newsreel camera-
men.40 Despite the keen competition among the journalists 
and considering the clamor for photographs there were few 
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breaches of the cameramen's agreement with presiding judge 
Thomas W. Trenchard. A justice of the State Supreme Court 
who initially had considered closing the court to cameras, 
he changed his mind after conferring with representative of 
the photographers and decided only four cameramem would be 
allowed inside the courtroom "to take pictures at vantage 
points three times each court day; immediately before the 10 
a.m. convening, during noon recess, and after court 
adjourned in the afternoon. 11 41 Newsreel photographers who 
were not included in the judge's order applied for permis-
sion to cover the trial, claiming that their right of access 
was equal to that of still photographers and reporters.42 
Judge Trenchand granted permission after the newsreel crew 
demonstrated its muffled noiseless camera and unobtrusive 
lighting equipment. The judge consented to placing a silent 
camera on the floor of the courtroom, a sound camera in the 
balcony and another in the library adjacent to the courtroom 
- with orders that no filming would be permitted when the 
judge was seated on the bench.43 Ther~ were few violations 
of the judge's orders by the camera crews but on February 4, 
Judge Trenchard withdrew permission for all photographic 
coverage in the courtroom when he learned that the sound 
camera had been operating for several days while court was 
in session. The camera had been so well soundproofed that 
the judge and public learned of the filming only when some 
of the footage was releasect.44 
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New Jersey Attorney General David Wilentz, the chief 
prosecutor, demanded that the five newsreel companies not 
show the trial fo~tage.45 Fox Movietone News and Paramount 
withdrew their reels from distribution in New York and New 
Jersey, but Pathe and Universal refused to comply.46 Much 
of the publicity in the Hauptmann trial was prejudicial, but 
mainly the damage was primarily not done by the use of 
cameras in the proceedings but by lawyers and reporters who 
issued statements that were clearly inflamatory, such as 
Hauptmann being described in the press as a "thing lacking 
in human characteristics. 11 47 Some articles condemned 
Hauptmann as an "Immigrant Nazi Killer", while others were 
faulted for invasion of privacy, printing rumors convicting 
Hauptmann.48 Grievances about news photographers were minor 
in comparison to the bill of particulars drawn up against 
the print journalists. Besides the violations of the 
judge's orders, photographers were criticized for their bad 
taste in taking pictures during recesses in which placards 
marked the seats occupied by principal trial figures and 
when photographers doggedly pursued witnesses outside the 
courtroom.49 
The attorneys' performances during the trial also was 
criticized. They were condemned for their out-of-court 
statements and their deliberately planned propaganda used 
purely for the purpose of personal publicity.so 
Editor and Publisher concluded in one of its editorials 
that reform "must be one of mind and heart in the legal 
profession. When the law again respects itself it will 
compel the respect of others".51 Prominent attorneys also 
voiced their disapproval of the lawyers' actions at the 
trial. Harold R. Medina, associate professor of law at 
Columbia University, articulated the sentiments of many 
editors: 
I do not blame the newspaper reporters and the 
photographers for getting whatever news and what-
ever pictures they can. I do blame the lawyers 
for the statements they make to the reporters and 
for the deliberately planned propaganda purely for 
the purpose of personal publicity which pollutes 
the administrat5~n of justice and discredits the 
bar as a whole. 
The Hauptmann trial prompted many states to seek 
solutions to the problem of trial publicity which was 
believed to be the work of the media. Legislation was 
introduced in some states prohibiting all forms of elec-
tronic devices from the courtroom and its vicinity.53 
In Maryland it was decided to "outlaw the making of 
sound pictures at a court session during trial and to 
prohibit showings of such pictures made in any other 
states".54 
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Succumbing to pressures from the local bar association, 
attorneys, and others, Los Angeles killed promising experi-
mental broadcast of traffic court proceedings. "I still 
think broadcasting would be allright but there is too much 
opposition," said California District Court Judge Joseph 
ca11.55 
The Judicial Council of New York, a group which studied 
reforms in court procedure for the state legislature, 
drafted a rule barring all photography and broadcasting in 
court.56 
The New York Daily News argued that written and 
pictorial journalism were too much alike to justify an 
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inferior constitutional status for photographers. It stated 
Some may contend that there is something more 
'sensational' in the pictorial method than the 
other; but this shaft of criticism arises from 
habits of thought -- the abhorrence which many 
minds display for whatever is novel -- rather than 
from any application of sound criticism.57 
Members of the ABA decided to act before the momentum 
generated by the Hauptmann trial subsided. Its president 
William L. Ransom formed the special committee on coopera-
tion between the Press, Radio and Bar against publicity 
interferring with Fair Trials in Judicial and Quasi-Judicial 
proceedings.58 
On the committee were seven representatives from the 
American Newspaper Publishers Association, five from the 
American Society of Newspaper Editors and six from the 
ABA.59 
At the 1937 ABA convention the committee reported it 
had reached accord on all matters under consideration except 
one - cameras and sound equipment in court. It asked the 
House of Delegates to adopt its six recommendations: 
That no use of cameras or photgraphic appliances 
be permitted in the courtroom, either during the 
session of the court or otherwise. That no sound 
registering devices for publicity use be permitted 
to operate in the courtroom at anytime. That the 
surreptitious procurement of pictures or sound 
records be consid55ed contempt of court and be 
punished as such. 
The committee also termed the Hauptmann trial as: 
The most spectacular and depressing example of 
improper publicity and professional misconduct 
ever presented to thg people of the United States 
in a criminal trial. 1 
Canon 35 
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The House of Delegates accepted the six recommendations 
and urged the committee to obtain "an agreement of the three 
groups concerned" on the unresolved question of cameras and 
reorders in court.62 But three days later, September 30, 
1937, the committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances 
proposed additions to the Canons of Professional and 
Judicial. Ethics, including Cannon 35 which was in a supple-
mentary report.63 Canon 35 forbade taking of photographs in 
the courtroom, including both actual court sessions and 
recesses. It was passed without a reading, or discussion 
with press members of the special committee nor was any 
reference made to the mutually exclusive report accepted 
three days before.64 
The updated Canon 35 declared that broadcasting or 
photographing court proceedings: 
Detract from the essential dignity of the proceed-
ings, distract the participants and witnesses in 
giving testimony and create misconceptions with 
respect thereto in the mind of the public and 
should not be permitted.65 
Although it was only a bar association canon, the 
entire federal judiciary and all state judiciaries, except 
Colorado and Texas adoped the ban.66 In 1952, Canon 35 was 
amended by the ABA to ban television also.67 The wording 
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was revised in 1963, but the revision did not alter the 
impact of the Canon, which was adopted by most states and 
followed in practice by most of the rest.68 There was a 
stong push from newspaper, broadcast, and photography groups 
for a relaxation of Canon 35 but the ABA remained adamant. 
The ABA established special committees in 1954 and in 1958 
to study Canon 35 but the committees recommended the 
restriction remain.69 
Since Texas had not adopted Canon 35, broadcasters were 
permitted to cover trials like a murder trial in Waco, 
Texas, on December 6, 1955.70 Presiding judge, D. W. 
Bartlett previously had allowed photographers in the court-
room on the condition they did not disturb the court. Bill 
Stinson, news editor of KWTX-TV, obtained the judge's 
consent to bring his television camera into the courtroom 
under the same restrictions as still cameras.71 
The television camera was mounted on the balcony and 
the entire trial was telecast live.72 
By 1959, Colorado, Oklahoma and Texas had begun to 
allow full electronic equipment and cameras in their court-
rooms while individual judges in at least a dozen other 
states ignored the canon and were not reprimanded for doing 
so.73 
Developments 
Either isolated instances or common practice allowed 
cameras in the courtrooms of Washington, Arizona, South 
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Dakota, Mississippi, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Iowa, 
Georgia and Nebraska by 1959.74 
Estes!.:._ Texas (381 U.S. 532, 19·65) 
"The life or liberty of any individual in this land 
should not be put in jeopardy because of actions of any news 
media 11 75 Justice Tom Clark wrote in Estes V. Texas. He held 
that First Amendment protections does not extend rights to 
the television medium to enter the courtroom. 
Even the most liberal of jurists reject the view that 
the public's right to know entitles the media to broadcast 
or photograph judicial proceedings. Justice Willima 0. 
Douglas maintains for example that: 
Such coverage imperils fair trial because of the 
insidious influences which it puts to work in the 
administration of justice. The historic concept 
of a public trial envisages a small close 
gathering, not a city-wide, state-wide or nation-
wide arena. The television camera would place 
added tension upon witnesses, and such a strained 
atmosphere would not be conducive to the quiet 
search for truth. Unimportant miniscules of the 
whole would be depicted and they would be the 
sensational moments . . . . Judge and Lawygrs 
would be tempted to play to the galleries.·! 
It was in this spirit and setting that the Billie Sol 
Estes case came to the United States Supreme Court. Estes, 
a Texas financier, came to trial in 1962 for theft, 
swindling and embezzlement involving the federal government. 
Over Estes' objection, the trial judge permitted television, 
radio, and the print media to cover segments of the trial. 
The initial pre-trial hearing was carried on in a small 
courthouse and was broadcast live by radio, and television. 
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Twelve or more cameramen were engaged in the courtroom and 
cables, wires, snaked across the floor. Microphones were on 
the judge's bench and television lights were beamed at the 
jury box and counsel table. 
Video tape recordings fo the trial also were telecast 
extensively in the regular news programs in the Smith County 
area. Commentators discussed various parts of the testi-
mony. 
Estes was convicted and appealed partly on the grounds 
that he had been deprived of due process of law by the 
televising of the trial. But in 1964, the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals found no injury to Estes from the tele-
casts, and Estes appealed to the High Court. 
The Supreme Court's decision came within one vote of 
barring all television from all courts on constitutional 
grounds. The court held that, in this case, notorious 
pretrial publicity, disruptive use of television at a 
pretrial court hearing and partial televising of the trial 
itself (all over the defendent's objections) combined to 
deprive Estes of his constitutional right to a fair trial.77 
It was in this case that the impact of television on 
witnesses, jurors, trial judges, and on the defendant was 
clearly spelled out. Justice Clark listed these as the 
probable effects: 
1. The jury's attentiveness at trial would be 
affected by the obstructions of television 
equipment, and the distraction resulting from 
knowing that televising was being done. 
2. The quality of testimony in crimintal trials 
would become frightened, cocky and given to 
overstatment and forgetfulness. 
3. The trial judge's undivided attention would be 
diverted if he had to supervise the telecast; 
he also would have undesirable reactions to 
the psychological impact of the presence of 
television.78 
Justice Clark pointed out the specific impact of 
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television coverage in the Estes case. The trial judge was 
harrassed by the presence of television and by the frequent 
changes he had to make in the nature of the coverage to 
protect witnesses. 
In recounting problems and difficulties faced by the 
trial judge, Justice Clark wrote: 
Plagued by his original error, recurring each day 
of the trial, his day to day orders made the trial 
more confusing to the jurors, the participants and 
the viewers. Indeed it resulted in a public 
presentation of only the State's side of the 
case.79 
Justice Clark had no doubt in his mind as to the 
prejudicial effects of television. 
A defendant on trial for a specific crime is 
entitled to his day in court, not in a stadium, or 
a city or a nationwide arena. The heightened 
public clamor resulting from radio and television 
coverage will inevitably result in prejudice. 
Trial by television is, therefore, foreign to our 
system.80 
In this context the judge continues, "Truth is the sine 
qua non of a fair trial. The use of television cannot be 
said to contribute materially to this objective."81 
Chief Justice Earl Warren, with whom Justice Douglas, 
and Justice Arthur Goldberg joined, concluded that tele-
vising of trials violates the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments based on three grounds: 
1. The televising of trials diverts the trial 
from its proper purpose in that it has an 
inevitable impact on all the trial partici-
pants. 
2. It gives the public the wrong impression about 
the purpose of trials, thereby detracting from 
the dignity of court proceedings and lessening 
the reliability of trials. 
3. It singles out certain defendants and subjects 
them to trials under prejuaicial conditions 
not experienced by others.82 
Justice Warren continued that television can work 
profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses 
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on; either consciously or unconsciously "all trial partici-
pants act differently in the presence of television 
cameras. 11 83 
The Chief Justice pointed out that the events sur-
rounding the Estes case showed a vivid illustration of the 
inherent prejudice of televising court proceedings. He 
stated 
The evil of televised trials, as demonstrated by 
this case lies not in the noise and appearance of 
the cameras, but in the trial participants' aware-
ness that they are being televised. To the extent 
that television has such an inevitable impact it 84 
undercuts the reliabiility of the trial process. 
Justice Warren concluded: 
The television camera, like other technological 
innovations, is not entitled to pervade the lives 
of everyone in disregard of constitutionally pro-
tected rights. The television industry, like 
other institutions, has a proper area of activi-
ties and limitations beyond which it cannot go 
with its cameras. The area does not extend into 
an American courtroom.85 
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The unique aspect of this case was that the five 
members of the majority were convinced television was 
turning the courts into a theatre and commercial entertain-
ment. They pointed out that the tapes of the hearing on 
September 4, 1964, were run in place of the "Tonight Show," 
and another station ran the tapes in place of the late night 
movie, while advertisements for soft drinks, soaps, eyedrops 
and seat covers were inserted during the commercial pause in 
the proceedings.86 
Commenting on the phenomenon, Chief Justice Warren 
wrote: 
The televising of trials would cause the public to 
equate the trial process with forms of entertain-
ment regularly seen on television and with the 
commercial objectives of the television indus-
try. 87 
Justice John Harlan in his concurring opinion confined 
its conclusion to the special facts of the Estes case. 
Although the decision had a five-four vote majority, it 
was the opinion of Justice Harlan that kept the Supreme 
Court from establishing a permanent ban. Three of the 
justices were ready to seize the opportunity offered by the 
Estes case to finally put the issue to rest as a matter of 
constitutional law.89 But Justice Harlan restricted the 
majortity opinion and paved the way for a wait on the new 
medium by leaving room for future experimentation. 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan stated: 
Permitting television in the courtroom undeniably 
has mischievous potentialities for intruding upon 
the detached atmosphere which should always sur-
round the judicial process. Forbidding this 
innovation, however, would doubtless impinge upon 
one of the valued attributes of our federalism by 
preventing the states from pursuing a novel course 
of procedural experimentation.90 
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He agreed that in the Estes case the use of television 
and other electronic media equipment was made in such a way 
that the right to a fair trial assured by the Due Process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was infringed. But even 
so Harlan suggested: 
The day may come when television will have become 
so commonplace an affair in the daily life of the 
average person as to dissipate all reasonable 
likelihood that its use in courtrooms may dis-
parage the judicial process. If and when that day 
arrives, the constitutional judgment called for 
now would of course be subject to re-examination 
in accordance with the traditional workings of the 
Due Process Clause.91 
The Chief Justice pointed out that he only could 
conclude with this particular case that televised trials, at 
least in cases like this one, "possess such capabilities for 
interfering with the even course of the judicial process 
that they are constitutionally banned."92 
Justice Potter Stewart with whom Justice Clark, Justice 
William Brennan, and Justice Byron Whilte joined in 
dissenting, wrote he could not agree with the court's 
decision that the circumstances of the Estes trial led to a 
denial of the partitioner's (Estes) Fourteenth Amendment 
rights. He did agree that the use of television in a 
courtroom at the present state of the art is an extrememly 
unwise policy which invites many constitutional risks and 
detracts from the inherent dignity of the courtroom.93 
Touching on the realm of free communication, Justice 
Stewart stated: 
I would be wary of imposing any per se rule which, 
in the light of future technology, might serve to 
stifle or abridge true First Amendment rights. 
The idea of imposing upon any medium of communica-
tions the burden of justifying its presence is 
contrary to where I had always thought the pre-
sumption must lie in the area of First Amendment 
freedom.94 
Justice Stewart concluded that where there is no 
disruption of the "essential requirement of the fair and 
orderly administration of justice, freedom of discussion 
should be given the widest range."95 
Justice White also dissenting stated the currently 
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available materials and evidence used to assess the effects 
of cameras in the courtroom are too sparse and fagmentary to 
constitute the basis for a constitutional judgment perma-
nently barring any form of electronic coverage. He empha-
sized that the Supreme Court had earlier ruled in a similar 
context (Rideau V. State of Louisiana) regarding the use of 
cameras in courtrooms. "We know little of the actual impact 
to reach a conclusion on the bare bones of the evidence 
before us."96 
Donald Gillmor, a professor in the School of 
Journalism, University of Minnesota, points out his disa-
greement with the majority's view in the Estes case 
regarding televised trials. He claimed some opinions of the 
Chief Justice "do no honor to American Journalism.'' He 
wrote: 
In the judgment of some critics of the court, 
there was much poppycock in the majority opinions 
in the Estes case. Television coverage of a trial 
need not necessarily imply either notoriety or 
morbid public ~9terest. The public interest may 
be legitimate. 
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The Estes decision to allow the use of cameras would be 
a violation of the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to 
due process virtually closed state courtrooms to cameras. 
The debate confirmed for most judges the wisdom of Canon 35 
that television was a threat to the decorum and dignity of 
their courtrooms. In addition, the ambiguity of the Supreme 
Court's decision made any experimentation risky. Only 
Colorado continued to allow cameras in the courtroom after 
the Estes decision, but only with the defendant's approval. 
More than a decade would pass before any significant number 
of judges would begin to think about the possible benefits 
of television. The Estes case has been considered here at 
greater length because it is extremely illustrative of the 
issue of cameras in courtroom (electronic coverage of court 
proceedings) .99 
The Estes ruling did not end the controversy as the 
media continued to push the issue. The Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit in 1967 upheld the contempt conviction of 
a television news photographer who, in violation of a 
standing order of the court, took television pictures of a 
defendant and his attorney in the hallway outside a court-
room after the defendant's arraignment. 100 The order fol-
lowed recommendations of the Judicial conference of the 
United States by condemming the taking of photographs and 
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broadcasting in the courtroom or its environs in conneciton 
with any judicial proceeding.101 "A defendant in a criminal 
proceeding,'' said the court, "should not be forced to run a 
gauntlet of reporters and photographers each time he enters 
or leaves the courtroom."102 
The creation of adverse media publicity by electronic 
equipment began to have less effect as grounds for a 
mistrial or unfair trial by the later part of the sixties. 
Various appeals courts ruled out adverse media publicity as 
grounds for a new trial. The Michigan Court of Appeals held 
that the reporting by a local radio and a local television 
station shortly after a defendant's arrest that he was 
suspected of killing his son with a belt and a frying pan 
was not sufficient to establish that publicity had denied 
the defendant a fair trial where there was no evidence that 
the broadcasts prejudiced the deliberations of any juror or 
that they were part of an atmoshpere which created a high 
probability of prejudice. 103 (People v. Person, 1974 W.W. 
2d 67 Mich. App. 1969). 
Another Appeals Court, in Margoles V. United States, 
407 F. 2d 727 (7th Cir. 1969) also ruled that where there is 
no threat or menace to the integrity of a trial, the courts 
should refrain from controlling news coverage of a case. 
But when such threats arise, the court should take appropri-
ate steps to protect its integrity depending upon the 
severity of the threat to the integrity of the trial. 104 
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Canon 3A (7): ABA Canon of 
Judicial Conduct 
Canon 35 remained unchanged until 1972 when the Canons 
were replaced by the code of judicial conduct. Canon 35 
became 3A (7) of the new rules. It acknowledges the 
advantages of modern technology for presenting evidence, 
making a record, and other purposes of judicial administra-
tion but not for news coverage. It states that a judge 
should prohibit broadcasting, telecasting, recording, or 
taking photographs in the courtrooms and areas immediately 
adjacent thereto during sessions of court or recesses 
between sessions, except that the judge may authorize: 
(a) The use of electronic or photographic means 
for the presentation of evidence, for the 
perpetuation of a record, or for other pur-
poses of judicial administration. 
(b) The broadcasting, televising, recording or 
photographing of investive, ceremonial, or 
naturalization proceedings. 
(c) The photographic or electronic recording and 
reproduction of appropriate court proceedings 
under the following conditions: 
i. The means of recording will not dis-
tract participants or impair the 
dignity of the proceedings; 
ii. The parties have consented and the 
consent to being depicted or recorded 
has been obtained from each witness 
appearing in the recording and repro-
duction; 
iii. The reproduction will not be exhibited 
until after the proceedings has been 
concluded and all direct appeals have 
been exhausted; and 
iv. The reproduction will be exhibited only 
for instructional pur8oses in educa-
tional institutions. 1 5 
However, since temperate conduct of judicial proceed-
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ings is essential to the fair administration of justice, the 
recording and reproduction of a proceeding should not 
distort or dramatize the proceeding. 
Though Canon 3 (7) does not have the force of Law in 
and of itself, it has the support of the ABA which signifies 
that it may be followed by most states in the country. In 
August 1978, a revision of the 1966 ABA Standards regarding 
a fair trial and free press (The Reardon Report) was 
presented to the ABA convention. The proposed revision 
included a statement that television, radio, and photo-
graphic coverage of judicial proceedings is not inconsistent 
with the right to a fair trial. 106 The ABA House of 
Delegates adapted the revision but deleted the section 
dealing with electronic coverage (television, radio, and 
photographic coverage). Hence, the standards relating to a 
fair trial and free press continued to ignore that contra-
versial issue, and the House of Delegates overwhelmingly 
rejected any change in the Canon at its meeting in February, 
1979. 107 
Had it accepted the revision of the Canon, a change in 
the wording of Canon 3A (7) would have been necessary. 108 
However, the action and behavior of the House of Delegates 
towards the issue clearly indicates that the American Bar 
Association remains adamant towards the issue of electronic 
coverage of court proceedings. 
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Bar-Press Confrontation 
Debate continues regarding the role of the camera, 
radio and microphone as well as the pen and typewriter in 
the coverage of pre-trial and courtroom proceedings. 
Conflicting opinions about the issue varies in statements 
made by journalists and legal experts and in the opinions of 
the judges themselves. Opinions like those of the late H.B. 
Swope, former editor, New York World, are common: "There 
are rights that the accused must be guaranteed, for after a 
climate has been created, you could convict St. Peter."109 
Claude R. Sowle, former associate dean, Northwestern 
University School of Law said: 
In my opinion, pretrial reporting can and often 
does serve a useful purpose. And a strong and 
free press is every bit as essential as a sound 
court system to the preservation of our way of 
life.110 
Some legal practitioners argue that media coverage of 
details of arrests, proceedings of investigators, prelimi-
nary hearings and the actual trials impair the effective 
functioning of the judicial process. 
Justice Douglasl a vigorous champion of First Amendment 
rights, considered mass opinion a dangerous master of 
decision when the stakes were life and death. 
It (media) has no business there. It is anathema 
to the very conception of fair trial. The court-
room at these times is as sacrosanct as the 
cathedral to be guarded against all raucous, 
impassioned and foreign influence.111 
The late justice also conceded that rules of evidence 
are designed to narrow the issues and protect the accused 
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against prejudice. "Judges, not newspaper reporters, 
fashion and supervise those rules . . . for legal trials are 
not like elections, to be won through the use of the 
meetinghall, the radio and the newspaper. 11 112 
The late U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stanley F. Reed 
expressed concern about media stimulation that can lead to 
"grievious tragedies in the administration of justice. 1111 3 
The late Justice Hugo Black, a leading guardian of the First 
Amendment, was highly sensitive to the due process rights of 
the accused. He seemed to suggest the total exclusion of 
the media from the courtroom. In his dissenting opinion in 
Cox V. Louisiana the judge wrote: 
The very purpose of a court system is to adjudi-
cate controversies, both criminal and civil, in 
the calmness and solemnity of the courtroom accor-
ding to legal procedures. 114 
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, chairman of the judi-
cial conference of the United States, has often and openly 
expressed his hostility towards media coverage of court 
proceedings. He has said that he would not "sit on the 
bench if there were a television camera in the room. 1111 5 
Cameras have never been allowed in the Supreme Court 
chamber, even for such rituals as the oath-taking ceremony 
for a new justice or when the Chief Justice delivers public 
speeches. Burger often has claimed that allowing television 
coverage of court proceedings was an invasion of privacy. 116 
Justices of the Supreme Court seem to have recognized 
the controversy surrounding electronic coverage in the Free 
Press-Fair Trial issue and have admitted the possibility of 
an unfair trial because of prejudicial publicity. Justice 
Clark speaking for the majority in the Estes V. Texas case 
said: 
While maximum freedom must be allowed the press in 
carrying on this important function in a demo-
cratic society its exercise must necessarily be 
subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in 
the judicial process. The life and liberty of any 
individual in this land should not be put in jeopardy because of actions of any news media. 117 
Some authorities in the bar and the media have advo-
cated voluntary controls to limit sensational publicity 
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surrounding a trial. They believe that members of the media 
should try to reach an accord among themselves as to what 
type of information should not be broadcast and published. 
Proponents and protectors of absolute media freedom 
argued there should be no control whatsoever in the coverage 
of trials and criminal cases. Based on the First Amendment, 
the contention of the media is that freedom carries with it 
a compelling obligation to keep the public informed on all 
pertinent issues. Dissemination of information they argue 
should be immediate, accurate and objective. 
Journalists in both print and the electronic media, 
share the belief that, rather than endangering the rights of 
the accused, trial coverage helps to discover violations of 
rights, such as secret confinement, denial of access to 
family or counsel, prolonged custody without proper arraign-
ment, search without warrant and maltreatment under custody. 
James R. Wiggins, former editor of the Washington Post, 
said: 
The full reporting of judicial proceedings is 
indispensable to the exercise of the accused's 
constitutional rights. It improves the quality of 
the testimony, informs the public of the effi-
ciency of its courts, and educates the CQmmunity 
in the nature of judicial proceedings. 11~ 
Supporters of the ban on electronic media coverage of 
court proceedings, mostly lawyers and judges, contend the 
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use of cameras in courtrooms is a dangerous phenomenon that 
creates unwanted publicity, discourages witnesses from 
appearing in court cases, and causes unwanted anxieties and 
fears in clients and the possibility of a rowdy court-
room.119 
Joseph Costa, former chairman of the board, National 
Pess Photographers Association, Inc., views a ban on cameras 
in courts and censorship of information generally as danger-
ous. "The American Public is conditioned to receiving and 
demands to know the facts regarding any crime of great 
public interest. 11 120 
Those who are most anxious about television's impact on 
the judicial process tend to be those with little or no 
exposure to actual coverage. There are amazing tales and 
conjectures in various forms from critics around the country 
who project a list of horribles if television cameras are 
allowed to stay in the courts. In places like Florida where 
pictures from the courtroom are commonplace daily, the "real 
world" bears no resemblance whatsoever to the doomsday 
forecasts. 
Critics believe TV will corrupt the judicial process. 
But Florida, the leader in televised trials, has yet to see 
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the "dire consequences" critics predict. Television as a 
medium and an industry deserves all of the intense scrutiny 
it receives but not all of the criticism is valid or fair. 
Those who equate television coverage of courts with a greedy 
search for entertainment, ratings and profits grossly dis-
tort the art of electronic journalism. 
The nation's most widely read newspapers, The New York 
Times and The Wall Street Journal also base their adver-
tising charges on the size and make up of audiences they 
deliver and in quest of larger audiences. 
But it doesn't follow that their news coverage neces-
sarily is predicated on such consideration. To date not a 
shred of material evidence has emerged to show that camera 
access has been incompatible with the right to due process 
and a fair trial, 121 and to the contrary because cameras 
have an inherent capability that pencil and paper do not. 
Television conveys the reality of the courtroom far more 
accurately than any other reportorial tool, and conveying 
that reality advances the ends of justice.1 22 
The Florida Supreme Court, in its final orders amending 
the code of judicial conduct, noted that newspapers and 
other print media also deal in entertainment, and asked: 
"Is a 'men's entertainment' magazine more calculated to 
educate and less to entertain than the local television 
station?" 
The best answer to such a question probably would be 
based on value judgment, but it would seem absurd for an 
individual to suggest that a reporter for such a magzine 
should be precluded from covering and reporting a trial 
because it is not intended to educate or inform the public 
but intends to exploit the courts commercially. 123 
Critics also contend that television cameras, apart 
from their effect on defendants, lawyers, judges, juries, 
witnesses, and the Sixth Amendment, also will change the 
respected judicial institutions. Television cameras have 
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focused on state legislatures, school boards, county commis-
sions, zoning boards, and the U.S. House of Representatives 
and did not remake these institutions. 
The legislature like the courts deal with issues 
affecting lives, liberty, property, and safety of the 
individual. Allen Morris, the highly regarded clerk of the 
Florida House of Representatives and a historian and student 
of the legislature for half a century, says about TV 
coverage: 
Television has subtly altered the legislative 
process for the better. Many of our legislators 
had their doubts about the wisdom of gavel-to-
gavel television because they feared television 
would encourage grandstanding. This did not 
happen, instead television coverage had a favor-
able impact on the lawmaking process. No one 
mumbles bills through. You seldom see legislators 
reading newspapers and never s124them eating lunch 
at their debates anymore . . . 
With the presence of television cameras, and its public 
scrutiny, those sponsoring bills are more careful to give 
the House and the public an adequate explanation of what a 
pending measure does. In short debates have become far more 
structured. 
Proven Advantages and Possible 
Disadvantages of Cameras in 
Courtrooms 
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Though there are notorious and disturbing trials, 
courtroom television didn't invent nor cause them. It only 
records them when allowed to bring them into the homes of 
thousands of viewers eager to learn about them. 
There were notorious trials before and without cameras. 
There were no cameras during the trials of Patty Hearst, 
Sacco and Vanzetti, John Peter Zenger, The Chicago Seven, 
The Scottsboro Boys, Murph the Surf, or Joan Little, despite 
the fact all are notorious. 125 
The legal establishment seem divided on the issue of 
the developing trend towards electronic reportage. Some 
consider it a rational adaptation to an era in which most 
Americans get much of their news from television; and see it 
as a beneficial innovation which will help to educate the 
public on how the courts operate, and through courtroom 
consideration of social and national issues will serve to 
raise the level of public debate. 
However, a majority views it as a dangerous trend that 
only will emphasize the most sensational trials, dramatize 
courtroom proceedings, increase grandstanding and eventually 
cause mistrials. 
Floyd Abrams, the constitutional lawyer who has been 
associated with the Pentagon Papers Case, the Myron Farber 
Case, the Nixon tapes and the Abscam Case said: 
The added scrutiny of the camera will help us deal 
with problems of corrupt prosecutors, of defen-
dants who are too close to judges, of judges who 
have a tendency to doze off. Television will be 
an additional check on governmental abuse and, as 
such, a good thing. 126 
An example of such scrutiny is the downfall of Judge 
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Christ T. Seraphim of Milwaukee, whose heavy-handed behavior 
on the bench had been a focus of discussion in the news 
media for years but without any results. Proud of his 
record as a hardline law and-order judge who had sentenced 
thousands of defendants to various jail terms, Judge 
Seraphim never objected when station WHA in Madison, 
Wisconsin, decided to take television cameras into his 
courtroom. 
The aftermath result was a piercing public-television 
documentary which graphically exposed what appeared to many 
as insensitivitiy and an overbearing manner of the judge. 
The television segment later became part of the evidence 
used by the Wisconsin Judicial Commission in finding the 
judge guilty of "misconduct.'' He was subsequently suspended 
from the bench for three years. 127 
Eric Saltzman, the former director of the Project in 
Criminal Trial Advocacy at Harvard Law School, said: 
There's a lot more of this going on than the 
general public realizes - judges who think the 
courtroom and its procedures are theirs, judges 
who don't follow the law, and just plain incompe-
tent judges ... and there are lawyers - lawyers 
arriving in court late, lawyers who don't prepare 
properly for a case, and lawyers whose standards 
are lower than they should be. The threat that 
one morning they might arrive in court and find a 
camera there, T~gld have a very beneficial effect 
on the system. 
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Floyd Abrams points out some of the possible benefits 
of electronic coverage over traditional means of reporting 
courtroom events are that electronic reporting is more real, 
more accurate, more vivid, and more informative. Television 
adds an immediacy you can't get from printed words and 
courtroom sketches, he said. 129 
Accuracy and vividness also were emphasized by Edward 
D. Cowarts, Chief Judge of Miami, who has presided over a _ 
number of televised trials including the highly publicized 
sex-murder trial of Theodore Bundy. At a meeting of the Bar 
Association of the City of New York on the subject of 
televising trials, Judge Cowart said: 
There is no doubt that with cameras reporting is 
more accurate, the reporter doesn't have to do his 
story from notes or from memory, which might be 
faulty. He can show the actual tape. That dis-
seminates graphically what takes place in the 
courtroom. T30 
However, a poll of members of the ABA shows that more of 
that organization's members oppose televising than support 
it. Most lawyers contend "people who are on camera act. 
Everyone in the courtroom will be play acting for the 
camera."131 
Roy M. Cohn, a New York attorney, thinks it's a 
terrible concept from the point of view of rendering 
justice: 
It would convert the courtroom to a stage and 
deflect the trial from its true purpose, which is 
the search for truth. Attention is going to go 
away from the issues in the trial onto who's 
looking good on camera. The major problem is not 
the mechanical equipment in the courtroom. The 
principal problem is the knowledge on the part of 
the participants that they are on a television 
show, that they are playing to the grandstand. 
During the Army-McCarthy hearings, I knew every 
minute that we were on televisio~ 3~nd that 30 
million people were watching it. 
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John Suttro, San Francisco attorney, was of the opinion 
that televising court trials turns them into "entertainment 
and drama to be toyed with by the media and plubic." He 
said cameras in courtrooms would upset witnesses, and jurors 
in that "If a witness had to be subpoenaed to testify 
because he is unwilling to volunteer, then the presence of 
television would scare him to death. 11 133 But to date there 
has been no research evidence that shows or links fear of 
witnesses or play acting in courts with television cameras 
or any other form of electronic news coverage devices. 134 
Some lawyers and judges call views propounded by 
critics of electonic reportage as "baseless." F. Lee 
Bailey, who defended Dr. Sam Sheppard in his retrial, is on 
record as saying that the public has a right to know what 
goes on in its courtrooms and that television, with its 
ability to convey constantly changing facial expressions and 
vocal inflections, is far more informative than the print 
media. He also believes the presence of a television 
camaera in a courtroom would improve the quality of justice: 
... Not only would a lawyer not dare to come into a 
courtroom unprepared, but a witness might be less 
likely to lie because so many people were 
watching. 135 
Robert A. Nance, attorney in Stillwater said: 
I favor the system of cameras in courtrooms among 
such reasons because it encourages a higher stan-
dard of performance from the three parties 
involved. Though, this can in some cases apply to 
mere showmanship, its most important tool is the 
education aspect and watchdog of the judiciary by 
making public its weaknesses and.strong points. 
It can also expose the finding of some lawyers who 
sometimes dwell on details by repetition in a b\~ 
to get an adjournment and reprepare themselves. 6 
Judge Jack Weinstein of the U.S. District Court at 
Brooklyn, New York said in a~ News interview that 
putting the eye of the public into the courtrooms through 
the powers of the present electronic media may improve the 
power of the court system at every level. "Even the U.S. 
Supreme Court where I think it's perfectly clear that 
argument ought to be televised. 11 137 
Ernest Schultz, Jr., formerly of Channel 9, KWTV in 
Oklahoma City and now executive vice-president of the 
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national Radio Television News Directors Association (RTNDA) 
said: 
Court coverage is important to a free and respon-
sible society~ It is objective in its course and 
should be encouraged and put to use in every 
state. Critics of the system seem to be unaware 
of its v~lue in maintaining a free and fair 
trial. 13t5 
Schultz cited the presence of modern electronic broad-
casting equipment as a great innovation that will help put 
down unnecessary criticism of electronic coverage. He said 
that modern TV cameras and microphones have capabilities of 
not making the slightest distraction. However, some really 
want to bother themselves about their presence: 
Cameras remain on tripods and won't have to be 
moved about. They operate on any available light 
source; some even operate in the dark. They don't 
make any noise and there is no "research" to show 
that camera coverage affects people during court 
cases. Rather, it lets participants, lawyers, 
judges, prosecutors, [and] witnesses, give their 
best performance. Each will realize the fact that 
this is important. I am bei~~9 watched and need to put out ~Y best performance. 
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Tim O'Brien, United States Supreme Court correspondent 
for the ABC television network said, "Having cameras in 
courtrooms or not is a public issue that should be left open 
for the public to decide." He believes that cameras should 
be present in every courtroom at all levels. "Its presence 
will not affect fair justice or change the nature of trials, 
it would enhance and inspire fair and accurate justice based 
on its openness."140 
The Florida Experience 
Until 1977, Florida, like most states, followed the 
guidelines of the ABA's Canon 15 and its successor, Canon 3A 
(7). The Florida Supreme Court was petitioned by state 
media groups like Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc. to 
lift the ban through a modification of Canon 3A (7). 141 
In its petition, Post-Newsweek, a subsidiary of the 
same company that owns the Washington Post, Newsweek, and 
other communication interests, including Florida television 
stations, WJXT in Jacksonville and WPLG in Miami, called 
Canan 3A (7) "An archaic impediment to fair and accurate 
coverage of the courts."142 
It pointed out that: 
Most Americans obtain their view of the news from 
television, yet under the present court rules, 
coverage of coy~ts by electronic media is awkward 
and unnatural. 3 
The petition proposed a rule to replace Canon 3A (7). 
It would allow courtroom coverage by electronic news 
gathering devices except "upon a showing of probable 
prejudice" to any party in the case. 144 
Other Florida press and bar groups, like the Florida 
Association of Broadcasters and local Society of 
Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi chapters, 
supported the petition. The conference of Circuit Judges 
and the Trial Lawyers Section of the Florida Bar were 
totally opposed. 145 
After seeing the demonstration of some new electronic 
news gathering devices, the state Supreme Court ordered a 
one year pilot program which would put into operation the 
"most liberal courtroom camera guidelines in the 
country. 11 146 
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Unlike the camera experiments of most other states, the 
consent of trial participants would not be required under 
the new rules, which gave access to all state judicial 
proceedings, including those of the appellate and Supreme 
Court. 147 Live and taped audio pickup for radio broadcast 
also was permitted. The only restrictions dealt with the 
amount, type and location of equipment, and prohibition of 
eavesdropping on privileged conversations. 148 
The Florida Supreme Court expressed its belief that a 
one-year experimental program was "essential to a reasoned 
decision on the petition" and entered an order saying: 
Consequently, in order to gain the experience 
which we deem essential to a proper final 
determination of this cause, it is the decision of 
this court to invoke a pilot program with a 
duration of one year from July 1, 1977, during 
which the electronic media, including still photo-
graphy, may televise and photograph, at their 
discretion, judicial proceedings, civil, criminal 
and appellate, in all courts of the state of 
Florida, subject only to the prior adoption of 
standards with respect to types of equipment, 
lighting and noise levels, camera placement, and 
audio pickup, and to the reasonable orders and 
direction of the presiding judge in any such 
proceedings. 149 
By mid-June 1977, the court issued its experimental 
guidelines which called for: 
1. Only a single video or motion picture camera, 
a single still photographer, a single audio 
system. However, two video or motion picture 
cameras would be allowed in an appellate 
court. 
2. All media pooling had to be done without the 
necessity for judicial mediation. 
3. Only equipment which did not distract with 
noise or light was permitted. All equipment 
had to receive pretrial approval by the judge. 
4. Media personnel and equipment were restricted 
to 1 locations setdbv.the 1udge andd~ere not al owed to move ur1ng the procee ings. 
5. Courtroom lighting could only be upgraded at 
media's expense and with the judge's permis-
sion. 
6. There would be no audio pick-up of privileged 
conversations. 
7. None of the video tape, film, photographs 
produced should ever be admissible as evidence 
in later proceedings on the same matter. 
8. The media would not be able to appeal rulings 
made under the guidelines. 
9. Members of the media and judiciary who 
operated under the guidelines were requested 
to make a report to the court at the end of 
the experiment. 150 
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The success of the Florida experiment revolutionized 
the thinking about televison in courts. A number of states 
adopted the Florida model.151 
During the experiment nearly every type of judicial 
proceeding was covered by Florida broadcast stations. The 
deliberations of the Florida Supreme Court, criminal trials, 
civil suits and even traffic court and small claims court 
cases were covered and reported. 152 All of the video 
taping, sound and picture editing both for radio and 
television were conducted under the strictest of guidelines: 
Only one camera and one crewman are allowed inside 
a courtroom; the camera is of the most modern 
types, as small as a shoe box, completely silent 
and capable of operating in ordinary room light; 
its position is fixed and unobstrusive and the 
camera may enter or leave only during recesses. 
In addition, coverage is pooled, with one televi-
sion station operating the courtroom camera and 
all other stations making video tape recordings in 
a separate media pooling room. 153 
Noise, light, cables, and confusion which had been the 
reality of Estes trial did not become the reality of Florida 
trials. With modern effective electronic equipment and 
guidelines that regulate every aspect of movement and 
behavior, electronic coverage of trails posed no physical 
disruption and no longer were a threat to the decorum and 
dignity of the court. 
During the pilot period, station WCKT-TV in Miami 
reported that it covered courtroom trials virtually daily, 
on more than two hundred occasions. 154 Eleven major news-
papers also reported the publishing of 473 courtroom 
photographs which gave their stories more credibility 
because of their presence in the courtroom. 155 
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As to be expected, the Florida experiment did not 
proceed unchallenged. Appeals based on the presence of the 
electronic equipment came within a week after the experiment 
began. 
A criminal defendant indicted for several felonious 
(fraud) acts in a state court proceeding unsuccessfully 
sought a preliminary injunction in federal court to enjoin 
the application of the experimental canon. An injunction 
was not issued since the federal district judge was unable 
to hold the experimental canon "patently and flagrantly 
unconstitutional," and the federal court simply 
abstained. 156 
Another federal challenge brought by the widow of a 
murder victim who asserted a right of privacy under the 
Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments also was dismissed on 
abstention grounds. 157 
The Florida Supreme Court also rejected an attempt made 
by a circuit judge to modify the experiment by allowing 
cameras only when all defendants, witnesses and jurors had 
given written consent. 158 
The constitutionality of the experiment based on the 
Estes decision was challenged many times during the experi-
ment but the Florida Attorney General rejected such argu-
ments by pointing to the lack of a blanket prohibition 
against cameras in Estes.159 
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In September and October of 1977, the Florida experi-
ment received national and international attention with the 
coverage of the Miami murder trial of Ronny Zamora who was 
charged with the killing of an 82-year-old neighbor during a 
burglary. 160 
The case was not the first televised murder trial but 
was significant because there never had been such wide 
coverage by and limited control of television cameras. The 
murder case also attracted national and worldwide coverage 
because of the unique defense by Zamora's attorney, Ellis 
Rubin. He argued his client was a ''television addict" and 
acted at the time of the crime under the influence of 
prolonged, intense, involuntary effects of television. 161 
The massive coverage attracted both critics and advo-
cates of electronic coverage of court proceedings. The 
trial was recorded in a noiseless and smooth manner by WPBT 
of Florida from whom other networks pooled. Due to the 
nature of the television medium itself, the guidelines set 
for using cameras in the courtroom and the self-imposed 
restraint by WPBT, there were differences between what the 
courtroom observers and television viewers saw. 162 
The difficulty a courtroom observer has before gaining 
entrance to the courtroom could not be compared to the ease 
and comfort experienced by the home viewer. 163 
The home viewer had an opportunity to see the responsi-
bility of a courtroom judge, the meaning of indictment, what 
an autopsy entails, jury selection and other necessary 
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judicial formalities. 164 The viewer was given the chance to 
see how the judiciary operates, how jurors wrestle with 
their biases and personal concerns, their attentiveness and 
total concentration on the proceedings. The viewer thus 
became an eyewitness to the courtroom tactics of each lawyer 
and how this compared to the drama of Perry Mason. 165 
Though, there were technical problems like sudden loss 
of sound, the viewers seemed to indicate a desire for 
similar future broadcasts. "WPBT received more than 1,000 
calls and 2,000 letters on its coverage, most of them 
complimentary."166 
One viewer wrote, "I found it more enlightening than a 
semester at law school." Another wrote, "I hope your 
judicious use of cameras firmly established them as part of 
every public trial because for the first time thousands of 
us were able to be on the scene to witness what goes on in 
real life courtrooms."167 
Presiding Circuit Judge Paul Balces, who originally had 
been against the Supreme Court's experiment, had nothing but 
praise for the media pool at the end of the trial, saying, 
"I have to commend you all . you've done a hell of a 
good job," and even presented the pool with a bottle of 
scotch. 168 
The trial of Mark Herman accused of the shotgun killing 
of Palm Beach oil executive Richard Kreusler became 
Florida's second major televised murder trial in February, 
1978. 169 The trial was recorded and televised smoothly 
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without any major problems associated with electronic 
coverage even though the defense attorney blamed the guilty 
verdict returned on his client on the impact of television 
cameras. 170 Presiding Judge Thomas Sholts said he believed 
the defendant had received a fair trial and praised the 
general conduct of the media. 171 
The Florida Decision and Its Aftermath 
The Florida experiment came to an end in July 1978. 
After reviewing reports and observations filed by judges, 
media representatives, and other interested parties, the 
State Supreme Court handed down its final decision on April 
12, 1979. 172 
The court granted the Post Newsweek petition for a 
change in Canon 3A (7). The new Canon would, under the 
watchful eye of the presiding judge, allow coverage of all 
public judicial proceedings on a permanent basis. 173 
Justice Sundberg, writing for a unanimous court, 
rejected the traditional argument against electronic 
coverage, especially those expressed in Estes. He cited the 
experiences of the year long experiment and the data 
generated and ruled the court could find little evidence 
that indicated electronic media coverage had interfered with 
the fair and orderly conduct of trials. 174 
The court pointed out that in some situations a witness 
might rightly be shielded from camera coverage such as in 
the case of a minor, rape victim or an undercover police 
agent and entru~ted the presiding judge to make such 
decisions on a case by case basis. 175 
The Florida experiment shows that most of the objec-
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tions and pitfalls traditionally associated with electronic 
coverage do not hold, and those that can cause havoc leading 
to mistrials happen in extreme cases and which easily can be 
avoided through stipulated guidelines, rules, and restric-
tions in and out of the courtroom. 176 
For instance, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the 
assertion that jurors behaved significantly different during 
the experiment. It called such concerns "unsupported by any 
evidence" as seen through their observations and the reports 
of the surveys carried out by the state judiciary. 177 
On the possible effects of cameras on witnesses, Judge 
Baker stated that this was not a problem in the Zamora 
trial, and pointed out that a judge already had sufficient 
sanctions to prevent witnesses from viewing other testimony. 
The witness who would violate the rule by watching 
portions of a trial on televison or listen to 
radio broadcasts is the same witness who would 
without hesitation devour every word in a news-
paper article which he had been instructed not to 
read. 178 
The Florida Supreme Court did reject the assertion that 
witnesses behaved differently during the experiment to 
hamper a fair trial. But the Court did concede that there 
were occasional instances of significant adverse impact on 
some categories of witnesses. The Court therefore made 
provision for the presiding judge to exclude camera coverage 
of a particular participant when the effect "could be 
qualitatively different from the effect on members of the 
public in general and such effect will be qualitatively 
different from coverage by other types of media."179 
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The court also dismissed another traditional fear that 
courtroom cameras would alter a judge's performance citing 
the lack of any such evidence during the test. It pointed 
out that "there was no significant difference in the 
presence of these influences as between the electronic and 
print media." 180 
On the issue that the electronic media were exploiting 
the court for commercial purposes, the court rejected such 
argument as baseless and pointed out that newspapers are 
also commercial entities. 181 
The Court did concede that selective coverage and 
editing by the electronic media can sometimes distort court-
room coverage. But it did point out that such practice do 
no apply only to the electronic media as the same dangers 
exist with traditional coverage and were therefore insuffi-
cient to warrant restrictions on electronic media. 182 
After a year of experimentation and exhaustive coverage 
of the two criminal trials widely monitored by most states 
in the country, there seems little doubt that the electronic 
media could operate in a courtroom without causing the 
disruptions experienced earlier. 
The Court pointed out many of the objections to 
electronic media coverage are really objections to media 
coverage in general. The Court, however, did develop 
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mechanisms and ce~tain corrective adjustments to assure a 
fair trial without curbing the media, the bar or the police. 
These are: (1) change of venue to remove the trial to 
an area not affected by the publicity, (2) the examination 
of prospective jurors on the voir dire with the view of 
eliminating those who may have been influenced, (3) the 
isolation of juries in protracted cases, (4) the postpone-
ment of a trial for substantial periods to allow the effect 
of prejudicial publicity to wear off, and (5) the reversal 
of convictions where necessary to assure justice. 183 
Apparently such devices and tests can apply equally 
well and effectively in an electronically covered courtroom. 
Apart from increasing the public knowledge and understanding 
of the judicial process, the use of electronic media in 
courtroom proceedings also would enhance the image of the 
bar, bench, and thereby elevate public confidence in the 
system, Justice Sundberg stated. 184 
Though its use is not without potential pitfalls, 
Justice Sundberg concluded, "A democratic system of govern-
ment is not the safest form of government, it is just the 
best man has devised to date, and it works best when its 
citizens are informed about its workings. 11 185 
The Florida experiment and the Court decision drew 
swift reactions from other states. 
Seventeen states joined Florida in urging the United 
States Supreme Court to permit experimentation to continue. 
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So did the Conference of Chief Justices representing the 50 
states. 186 
On the other hand, the American College of Trial 
Lawyers as well as a number of legal groups filed briefs 
opposing the procedure. A poll of ABA members showed an 
increase of that organization's members opposed to elec-
tronic coverage. The majority of the members still hold the 
traditional fears of unwanted publicity, the psychological 
effect on witnesses, jurors, and grandstanding and dramatic 
effects of all sorts. 187 
Whitney North Seymour, a past president of the ASA who 
has opposed electronic coverage of courtroom proceedings for 
more than 40 years, fears, for instance, that television 
will cause jurors to lose their anonymity, thereby making 
them more likely to respond to community pressures and 
opinions. He concluded: 
People may stop them (jurors) on the street and 
say, 'I certainly would convict that guy' or try 
to communicate with them at home or with their 
families. It'~ a pressure on the jurors. It will 
affect them. 18~ 
Research studies have yet to show electronic coverage 
causes psychological and social trauma to the court partici-
pants. 189 
Although no state that permits the televising of trials 
allows jury deliberations to be broadcast, some states are 
taking very seriously the problems of jurors being accosted 
on the street. They have prohibited cameras in their 
courtrooms from taking any pictures of the jurors. 190 
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The issue took a new turn in September of 1979, when 
the Florida high court refused to review the appeals of two 
Miami Beach policemen, Noel Chandler and Robert Granger, 
convicted and sentenced to seven years in jail and nine 
years probation for robbing a restaurant in Miami Beach on 
May 23, 1977. 191 
The state high court refused to review the appeals of 
the two convicted defendants on the grounds its April ruling 
rendered the dispute no longer a live legal controversy. 192 
The defendants' attorney based his appeal on the presence of 
television coverage against his clients objections. Two 
minutes and fifty-five seconds of the trial which depicted 
only the prosecution's side of the case were broadcast. 193 
On April 21, 1980, the Supreme Court agreed to decide 
whether camera coverage of courtroom proceedings by either 
newspaper or television is constitutional. 194 
The Supreme Court Decision 
Chandler V. Florida 
(449 ~ 460 1981) 
In January of 1981, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the 
case most people associate with the electronic coverage of 
the courts. Granger V. the State of Florida upheld the 
presence of cameras in the courts where the states so 
desired, but it was ruled not unconstitutional for a state 
to ban cameras from the courts. 
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The question which this case considered is simple: Is 
a defendant denied his right to a fair trial when his trial 
is televised over his objection? Noel Chandler and Robert 
Granger, former Miami Beach policemen, were charged in July 
1977 with conspiracy to commit burglary, grand larceny, and 
possession of burglary tools. 195 The counts also covered 
breaking and entering a popular local restaurant and the 
jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts. Appellants 
moved for a new trial claiming that television coverage in 
defiance of the defendants' objections had denied the 
appellants a fair and impartial trial. However, no evidence 
of specific prejudice was tendered. 196 
The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the 
convictions by reasoning that the Florida Supreme Court 
having decided to permit television coverage of criminal 
trials on an experimental basis, had implicitly determined 
that such coverage did not violate the federal or state 
constitutions. The District Court of Appeals also pointed 
out it found no evidence in the trial record that indicates 
the presence of a television camera had hampered the 
defendants in presenting their case or had deprived them of 
an impartial jury. 197 
In their briefs to the United States Supreme Court the 
attorneys for Chandler and Granger argued that the mere 
presence of television cameras during a trial prejudices its 
conduct by influencing the behavior of the witnesses, 
attorneys and the jurors. Such prejudices they said denies 
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the defendant his right to a fair trial, and if he objects, 
the judge should be required to order the cameras shut off. 
The attorneys emphasized that this is not an attempt to shut 
the media out of a trial altogether or ''gag" the press but 
contends that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of a 
defendant outweigh any First ~mendment right of cameramen to 
enter the courtroom and record events there. They argued 
further that: 
It is abundantly clear that pervasive publicity 
and the intrusion of the news media into the trial 
process itself can so alter, or destroy, the 
constitutionally necessary judicial atmosphere and 
decorum so that the defendant is denied the 
requirements of impartiality to which he is 
entitled as a matter of due process of law. 198 
In response, attorneys for the State of Florida argued 
that Chandler and Granger received a fair trial maintaining 
that "the participants and the jurors (in this case) were 
wholly unaffected by any publicity and the mere presence of 
a television camera." They pointed out that the Estes 
decision which the appellants rest their case heavily on 
does not control this case because it applied to a particu-
lar trial and did not ban the presence of all cameras from 
all courtrooms. 199 
The State's brief also addressed those who link the 
televising of the trial of the former policemen charged in 
the McDuffie death with the subsequent riots in Miami. If 
the media bore any responsibility for the riots, it stated 
it was due to its initial reporting of the McDuffie case, 
and not the televising of the trial; "had the entire trial 
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been broadcast, instead of excerpts, citizens could have 
seen the system at work instead of merely learning the 
results;" - and there might have been less violence, because 
there would have been better public understanding of the 
process leading to the verdict. 200 
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion of 
the court in the Chandler Case and was joined by Justices 
William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun, Powell, 
and William Rehnquist.201 Chief Justice Burger declared 
that the televising of trials, even in the face of a 
defendent's objection, is within the bounds of the constitu-
tion unless: 
If it could be demonstrated that the mere presence 
of photographic and recording equipment and the 
knowledge that the event would be broadcast 
invariably and uniformly affect the conduct of 
participants so as to impair fundamental fairness, 
our task would be simple; prohibition of broadcast 
coverage of trials would be required ... 202 
Justice Burger wrote: 
The question presented on this appeal is whether, 
consistent with constitutional guarantees, a State 
may provide for radio, television, and still 
photographic coverage of a criminal trial for 
public broad~5st, notwithstanding the objection of 
the accused. 5 
The Chief Justice answered that the requirement of a 
public trial is satisfied by the opportunity of members of 
the public and the press to attend the trial and report what 
they have observed. He added that an absolute constitu-
tional ban on broadcast coverage of trials cannot be 
justified simply because there is a danger that, in some 
cases, prejudicial broadcast accounts of pretrial and trial 
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events may impair the ability of jurors to decide the issue 
of guilt or innocence uninfluenced by outside forces. 
Justice Burger contended that the risk of juror prejudice in 
some cases does not justify an absolute ban on news coverage 
of trials by the printed media; so also the risk of such 
prejudice does not warrant an absolute constitutional ban on 
all broadcast coverage.204 
The Chief Justice pointed out that the appellants have 
shown nothing to demonstrate that their trial was subtly 
tainted by the electronic media. He stated a defendant must 
show something more than juror awareness that the trial is 
such as to attract the attention of broadcasters to demon-
strate prejudice in a specific case.205 He wrote: 
Dangers lurk in this, as in most, experiments, but 
unless we were to conclude that television 
coverage under all conditions is prohibited by the 
Constitution, the States must be free to experi-
ment. We are not empowered by the Constitution to 
oversee or harness State procedural experimenta-
tion; only when the State action infringes funda-
mental guarantees are we authorized to intervene. 
We must assume State courts will be alert to any 
factors th9t impair the fundamental rights of the 
accused.20b 
The Chief Justice concluded that these dangers do 
however not warrant an absolute ban on all broadcast 
coverage.207 
Justice White, concurring in the judgment restated his 
opinion as given in the Estes case that he remains convinced 
that a conviction obtained in a State court should not be 
overturned simply because a trial judge refused to exclude 
television cameras for televising all or parts of a trial to 
the public. He wrote: 
The experience of those States, which have, since 
Estes permitted televised trials supports this 
position, and I believe that the accumulated 
experience of those states has further undermined 
the assumption on ~g~ch the majority rested its 
judgment in Estes. 
Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court ruling some important 
trials covered by the electronic media became part of the 
controversy. Notable among them is the trial of the five 
white policemen accused of beating to death a black insur-
ance man, Arthur McDuffie. 
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The trial was televised almost in its entirety. After 
an all white jury found the policemen not guilty despite 
revelations by witnesses that McDuffie never resisted the 
policemen, a violent race riot erupted. The subsequent 
riot, violence, and destruction brought much criticism that 
camera coverage of the trial, not the acquittal of the 
policemen, triggered the riot. 
Joel Hirschhorn, attorney for the plantiff at the 
Chandler and Granger case, again expressed his absolute 
disagreement with the presence of cameras in courtrooms, 
saying: 
The recent civil disorders in Miami were not 
solely the result of what h~ppened in the McDuffie 
case. But the trigger that fired the shot, that 
ignited the city of Miami, that caused 100 million 
dollars in damage and that caused death and injury 
to many was the messenger (television) and not the 
message (the acquittal of the policemen).209 
Norman Davis, vice president of WPLG-TV in Miami and 
the nation's fiercest crusader for electronic coverage of 
courtrooms disagrees. He says: 
There had been a series of episodes involving the 
criminal justice system which had angered many 
blacks - one incident after another involving 
alleged police brutality and gross insensitivity 
by the Sheriff's department. The McDuffie killing 
took place on top of all these other incidents. 
Then the Miami Herald discovered that there had 
been a cover up, so by the time the trial came up, 
you could almost cut the tension in the air with a 
knife. The black community wanted justice and 
when justice didn't come as they perceived it, the 
frustration just blew out the top . . That 
had nothing to do with the messenger, that was 
just the message.210 
56 
Eric Saltzman, who spent months gathering materials for 
a film on the McDuffie trial, said the most upsetting and 
most dramatic thing people saw on television was the 
reaction shot of McDuffie's mother who broke down in tears 
when the judgment was pronounced. 
Joel Hirschhorn, Chandler's attorney, countered that 
the electronic media only covers the most sensational trials 
and its most sensational minutes. Rather than informing or 
educating the public the electronic media would in many 
cases "attempt to maximize ratings by offering selected, 
lurid glimpses into judicial proceedings.n211 
Norman Davis, vice president of WPLG-TV in Miami, again 
disagrees saying print journalist and those from the elec-
tronic medium, always have done concise summaries of what 
happens rather than recitations of the transcripts. He 
said: 
That's always been the mode of reporting trials. 
It is rare in the extreme for newspapers to print 
a full transcript, or even a lengthy transcript, 
of what happened on a particular day in court. 
They pick and sift and choose. News by definition 
is a digest of events rather than a full 
recounting of them212 
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However, Davis' explanation failed to show that trial 
reports in newspapers, though condensed, still are generally 
more detailed and elaborate than the electronic medium which 
has a shorter and very limited air time on a particular 
segment of a program. 
Steve Nevas, First Amendment Counsel for the National 
Association of Broadcasters (NAB), blamed the slow progress 
of the issue on the ABA and members of the judiciary. "The 
fact is judges and lawyers tend to think of the courts as 
their private preserve and sanctuary. They don't really 
want TV looking over their shoulders."213 
Judge Bruce Wright of the New York State Appellate 
Court disagreed with Nevas. He said most hands on the bench 
realized the benefits of the electronic medium (television) 
in the cour~s far outweighed its risk: 
I would certainly be delighted to see the courts 
open to television cameras, because far too long 
the court system has been a sort of secret 
society. The more the public can see what goes on 
in courtrooms, the more they will trust judges 
rather than fearing them. Especially if people 
want reform in the system, t~T~ must know more 
about it then they know now. 
Most states have exhibited great fear of the electronic 
medium in their courtrooms. Most, like Florida and 
Oklahoma, have insisted on an experimental period before 
making a permanent rule change. Many also have paid for 
expensive studies of the medium's impact on the trial 
process.215 
California is in a tryout period that is supposed to 
end December of 1982. It has a consulting group whose task 
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has been to observe people's behavior at trials and pass out 
questionnaires.216 
Gerald Miller, a communication professor at Michigan 
State University and a well known authority on the issue, is 
one of the consultants. After attending various TV/radio 
covered trials in the state, including that of Carol Burnett 
and the National Enquirer, Professor Miller said, "TV seems 
to have no detectable effect on anybody. 11 217 
That seems to be everyone's result and no try out 
period to date has ever ended with a state's refusal of the 
electronic media. Yet, suspicious attitudes based on the 
Hauptman and Estes trials remains, and each state believes 
it must run its own tests while 12 states out of the 38 
states that allow some form of coverage still forbid all 
audio, video, and still camera coverage of the judiciary.218 
A perusal of the different opinions presented above 
suggests the two sides - bar and the media - have yet to 
understand each other's functions. 
However, the literature indicates that generally, 
lawyers and other court practitioners seem to be more 
supportive of the Sixth Amendment. Members of the media 
advocate freedom of the press. Dr. Marlan D. Nelson, 
director, School of Journalism and Broadcasting, Oklahoma 
State University, found while analyzing 542 articles per-
taining to this issue that, "If a lawyer discussed the 
subject he usually titles his article 'Fair Trial - Free 
Press'. If a journalist wrote the article, he titled it 
'Free Press and Fair Trial'".219 
Some called for the co-existence of the two rights. 
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Francis L. Dale, past president of the Ohio Bar Association, 
wrote: 
I believe that the so-called free press-fair trial 
controversy has resulted primarily from the fact 
that most members of the perss and the bar do not 
understand the origin, history and application of 
these two very important parts of the Bill of 
Rights. If we are fully aware and fully under-
stand these two amendments, we can secure fair 
trials for the accused in criminal cases, without 
at the same time subm~E~ing to limitations on the 
freedom of the press. 
The Chandler ruling neither endorsed nor opposed tele-
vision in the courtroom. It simply said that it was 
constitutional for states to experiment if they so 
choose.221 
The ruling initially was expected to bring some changes 
like more states opening up courtrooms to the electronic 
media. But it only added fuel to the fire of resistance. 
Only eight states since have joined the thirty states that 
allowed electronic media in their courtrooms.222 
There's a lot of "hanging back," said Norman Davis. 
The Supreme Court failed to state in its decision that TV 
has a constitutional right to go into courts. Nor did the 
justices invite the medium into their own proceedings.223 
Schultz said: 
The feedback we are getting is that it didn't 
change anything, that it did not put a burden on 
anybody to do anything. Chief Justice Warren E. 
Burger, who wrote the Chandler opinion despite his 
own hostility to cameras in the courtroom, has 
made clear in private that the decision was meant 
only to allow the states to experiment if they 
wish. State judges who talked with him last 
summer reportedly got a lecture against read~~ij 
the ruling as an endorsement of TV coverage. 
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Schultz said the broadcast industry is troubled in that 
the state judicial response to Chandler, and to the earlier 
Richmond Newspapers V. Virginia, 448 U.S. 5551 (1981), which 
gave print media a constitutional right of access to 
criminal trials, has not focused on a favorable tone and 
content of those opinions: "You take the language of 
Chandler and put it together with Richmond and it spells 
'mother' to us. But in practice, it does not seem to spell 
more access. 11 225 
After the Chandler ruling broadcasters and their 
lawyers made efforts in some state courts to convert 
experimental coverage rules to permanent orders. They also 
asked for the relaxation of restrictions on criminal trial 
coverage. Neither was successfu1.226 
Since the Supreme Court decision has not changed 
anything nor brought any improvements or more states 
involvement, television camera crews may expect to continue 
to cover most of the nation's courthouses from across the 
street. Broadcast coverage inside courtrooms is allowed 
more as an exception than as a rule, and that is not likely 
to change noticeably for at least several more years. A 
survey of laws and court regulations nationwide shows these 
patterns. 
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TV coverage of criminal trials, direct from courtrooms, 
is not being allowed much more widely now even though the 
Supreme Court took away the major constitutional barrier in 
1981. 
Coverage of civil trials (usually, not so newsworthy) 
is gaining permission only a little more often. 
Broadcast access is most available for hearings in 
state appellate courts, especially the state supreme courts. 
But there is no broadcast coverage permitted in any 
case in any federal court, from the district courts up to 
the U.S. Supreme Court.227 
After 26 years since the "experiment" of TV coverage of 
courts began in Colorado, it still is treated in many states 
as merely experimental and the number of states presently 
involved in coverage shows limited promise that coverage 
will grow much further.228 
Experts in the field note that rather than having more 
states open up their courts, a new wave of resistance 
appears to be setting in. Schultz said: 
The easy victories have all been won. In those 
states where the bench and the bar have been 
receptive, we have gone pretty much as far as we 
can. In the rest of the states, it is going to be 
very, very slow. It is going to be very, very 
difficult to ease the restrictions that now exist, 
and to get states that allow no coverage to open 
up.229 
The trial of wealthy Claus Von Bulow in March of 1982 
was one of the most notorious criminal trials to be covered 
as part of a state (Rhode Island) one year experimental 
program.230 
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Von Bulow was convicted of trying twice to murder his 
wife, and while the judgment was being read TV cameras 
focussed on the defendant at the same time they showed how 
his teenage daughter reacted to the verdict. This triggered 
criticisms and complaints of camera coverage concentrating 
on the emotional aspect of the case.231 
But, the reaction and views from inside the courtroom 
were more positive and complimentary. 
said: 
The Superior Court presiding justice, Anthony Giannini, 
We had a lot of fears before we started this 
experimental year. We were afraid that cameras 
would make judges and others behave differently, 
but I haven't seen it happening. I haven't seen 
lawyers grandstanding more than usual. I haven't 
found witnesses more timid. The cameras haven't 
been annoying or disruptive.232 
Andrew Teitz, a court research technician who doubled 
as a press-liaison man during the trial, was of the 
impression that TV received many compliments from the public 
and very few complaints. As for the emotional moment, Teitz 
said, "If TV was guilty of exploiting that heart wrenching 
scene", (when the judgment was being read) "so were news-
papers such as the New York Times which ran the picture on 
its front page.233 
Rhode Island's experience with the Von Bulow trial 
received national attention but there was no circuslike 
atmosphere or sensational false reports which simply 
reflects what seems to happen in those states that 
experiment with the issue. The national verdict on TV in 
the courtroom is: with reservations, it seems to work.234 
In Oklahoma, the State Supreme Court adopted rules 
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authorizing a one-year pilot program which began on January 
1, 1979. Electronic media and still photographers may 
televise, broadcast, and photograph any Oklahoma court 
proceeding, subject only to the discretion of the judge and 
court adopted standards governing type, number, and place-
ment of equipment.235 
In short, the Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted revised 
Canon 3A (7) of the code of Judicial Conduct permitting 
electronic and photographic coverage of courtroom pro-
ceedings. 236 
The revised rule follows that set by Florida except for 
one or two modifications -- the court retains jurisdiction 
to revoke, modify or amend the Revised Canon 3A (7) at any 
time during the experimental period or thereafter. 237 
The Oklahoma revised Canon 3A (7) rules and guidelines 
states that a judge may permit broadcasting, televising, 
recording and taking photographs in the courtroom during 
sessions of the court, recesses between sessions, and under 
the following conditions: 
(a) Permission shall be granted by the judge 
to photograph, record, and under such 
conditions as the judge may prescribe; 
(b) The media personnel will not distract 
participants or impair the dignity of 
the proceedings; 
(c) No witness, juror or party who expresses 
any prior objection to the judge shall 
be photographed nor shall the testimony 
of such a witness, juror or party be 
broadcast or telecast; 
(d) No photographing or broadcasting of any 
court proceeding which under the state 
law are required to be held private; 
(e) No photographing or broadcasting of any 
portion of any criminal proceedings, 
unless all accused persons who are on 
trial shall have affirmatively, on the 
record given their consent to such 
photographing or broadcasting; 
(f) The number and kind of cameras and 
microphones permitted in the courtroom 
shall in the final analysis be subjected 
to the discretion of the judge. He 
shall also stipulate guidelines in 
regards to location of cameras, video 
feed, pooling, audio room, lighting, 
radio recording facilities, and not more 
than two television cameras, and two 
still photographers, each with not more 
than two cameras would be permitted in 
the court; 
(g) No witness, juror, or party shall give 
their consent for any consideration, of 
any kind or character, either directly 
or indirectly; and, 
(h) The Supreme Court, the Court of Criminal 
Appeals, and the Court of Appeals may 
authorize the broadcasting, televising, 
or taking of photographs of appellate 
proceedings and oral arguments.238 
The revised rule experimental period was expected to 
last for a period of one year. But it took the State more 
than three years to experiment before the plan was made 
permanent on February 22, 1982. (Pilot program started 
January 1, 1979 were made permanent on February 22, 1982.) 
Some states among those that are yet to open their 
courts to electronic coverage still are considering the 
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chances of studying the issue. However, conflicting opinion 
continues and the calls for unity and compromise have gone 
unheeded by the media and the bar. 
Professional groups have laid down guidelines and 
adopted resolutions in a move toward workable solutions. 
Cases involving the conflict continue and the issue per-
sists. Dr. Walter Wilcox remarked: 
Spectacular events have exacerbated the contro-
versy and brought it to general public attention. 
The Sheppard murder trial, the Billy Sol Estes 
case, the two Kennedy assasinations and a multiple 
murder case in Chicago ... all are cases in 
point.239 
An examination of selected free press - fair trial 
cases will place the conflict between the First and Sixth 
Amendments in better perspective. 
A Review of Cases 
Craig!.:._ Harney (331 U.S. 367, 1948) 
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This case involved a "drawn-out donnybrook 11 240 between 
the news media in Corpus Christi, Texas, and a local judge. 
Somebody sought to repossess a business building in town 
from a serviceman who claimed to have a lease. He argued 
the soldier had lost his interest due to nonpayment of rent. 
On May 26, 1945, the jury ruled for the defendant 
soldier but the judge instructed the jury to reconsider and 
return a verdict for the plaintiff - it refused. 
The following day a news item factually reported the 
court's orders and ended with the sentence: "The effect of 
this ruling was that Judge Browning took the matter from the 
jury".241 
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On May 29, the defendant moved for a new trial, and on 
May 30, an editorial criticized the judge for "travesty of 
justice" and his refusal to hear both sides of the issue. 242 
On June 4, a complaint charging the publisher, editori-
al writer and a news reporter of the local media with 
contempt of court was filed by an officer of the county 
court. The newsmen were found guilty of contempt and the 
appellate court upheld the conviction. 
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the orders 
of the Texas court by a 6-to-3 decision. It ruled the 
public had a right to know what went on during the 
proceedings and the media had every right to report them. 
Justice Douglas, in the majority opinion, stated: 
A trial is a public event. What transpires in the 
courtroom is public property. If a transcript of 
the court proceedings had been published, we 
suppose none would claim the judge could punish 
the publisher for contempt.24j 
Justice Douglas continued, "The Law of contempt is not 
made for the protection of judges who may be sensitive to 
the winds of opinion. Judges are supposed to be men of 
fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate."244 
Baltimore Radio Show Y._:_ State (193 MD) 
300, 1949; 338 U.S.~ 1950 -
Certiorari Denied) 
The case arose from three contempt citations issued by 
the Criminal Court of Baltimore, Maryland, imposing fines 
for news stories aired over the local radio stations about a 
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murder case at a time when a defendant charged with murder 
was in custody of the police. A radio broadcast was cited 
as adding this preamble to the news report: "Stand by for a 
sensation."245 
In the early afternoon of July 6, 1948, Marsha Brill, 
an 11-year old girl was found stabbed to death. That 
evening Eugene James, a former offender, was arrested and 
charged with murder. Stations WITH, WCBM, and WFBR, were 
reported to have made incriminating news broadcasts and 
comments about the incident. 
A Baltimore trial court found the three broadcasting 
stations guilty of contempt and imposed fines. 
The lower court ruled the broadcasts constituted "not 
merely a clear and present danger to the administration of 
justice, but an actual obstruction to the adminstration of 
justice in that they deprived the defendant of his constitu-
tional right to have an impartial jury tria1. 11 246 
I 
The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the contempt 
convictions. It ruled there was no direct evidence of 
prejudice because of the broadcast information, and no clear 
and present danger to satisfy the appropriate constitutional 
test. 
The court seems to have declined to accept the argument 
that jurors require more protection from potentially preju-
dicial comment than judges. 
Judge Markell contended that trial by news media had 
been substituted for trial by jury. Two conflicting 
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propositions represent much of the argumentation in the 
case. He wrote: "(a) Prejudice in a jury can always be 
prevented. So why worry? (b) Prejudice in a jury can never 
be prevented. So why try?" Judge Markell observes that it 
was only "a time honored apology for lynch law" to state 
that the trials in the court and the news media reached the 
same conclusion.247 
The state's Attorney General sought to appeal the 
appellate court's ruling, but certiorari was denied by the 
Supreme Court, letting stand the appellate court's reversal 
of the contempt citations. As a note, the State of Maryland 
started its experimental year of opening state courts to 
electronic coverage on January 1, 1981, and it is still 
experimenting as of December 1982. 
Graham V. People, 302 .!:..:_ 2d 737 
(Colorado 1956) 
This case involved a murder charge against one Gilbert 
Graham who admitted placing a bomb on an airplane to collect 
$35,000 in life insurance on his mother. Forty-four persons 
were killed in the resulting midair explosion. 248 
A Colorado District Judge permitted radio stations to 
make tape recordings and television reporters to take sound 
on film, despite the express request of the accused that 
television be excluded.249 
After the trial, the Colorado Supreme Court impressed 
by the performance of hundreds of media representatives 
present at the trial, broadly evaluated Canon 35 and added 
its own rule that television coverage of court proceedings 
be at the discretion of the trial judge.250 
69 
After six days of hearings and photographic demonstra-
tions, Justice Otto Moore of the Colorado Supreme Court 
could find no reason to bar modern camera equipment from the 
courtroom. The judge said, "That which is carried out with 
dignity will not become undignified because more people may 
be permitted to see and hear."251 
Thus, Colorado became the first State to officially and 
legally recognize and follow a revised Canon 35. Even when 
other state courts abandoned courtroom photography following 
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Estes V. Texas, Colorado 
continued to follow its "Rule 35".252 
Irvin V. Dowd (336 U.S. 1.lli_ 1961) 
The U.S. Supreme Court for the first time ruled on the 
question whether pre-trial publicity created by media 
reports (television, radio, newspapers) can create a wave of 
public passion leading to a mistrial for the accused before 
an impartial jury. 
Critics opposing electonic media coverage of court 
proceedings, and against all types of media personnel in 
courtrooms, always cited pretrial publicity as the cause of 
mistrials. While addressing itself to this particular case, 
the Supreme Court for the first time reversed a state 
criminal conviction solely on the grounds that pre-trial 
publicity had created "so huge a wave of public passion" 
that a fair trial for the accused before an impartial jury 
became impossible.253 
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On April 8, 1955, Leslie Irvin was arrested in Indiana 
on suspicion of burglary and issuing bad checks. Some days 
later, the Vanderburgh County prosecutor and Evansville 
police officials issued press releases stating that Irvin 
had confessed to six murders committed between 1954 and 
March 1955 in the Evansville area. They had received wide 
coverage in the local media. 
Irvin, indicted for one of the murders, successfully 
sought a change of venue from Vanderburgh County, and the 
court sent the case to adjoining Gibson County. 
Media coverage of the case both radio, television, and 
print "suggested" prejudicial publicity. Curbstone opinions 
of guilt and punishment were solicited, recorded and later 
broadcast. Various newspaper articles and cartoons pro-
claimed details of the defendant's background and referred 
to crimes he had committed as a juvenile, and to his 
convictions for arson 20 years earlier. He was depicted by 
the media as an AWOL soldier, burglar and parole violator. 
The police were no less guilty as they referred to the 
accused as "Mad Dog Irvin,'' a sane man but without remorse 
or conscience.254 
Vair dire examination of the jury lasted two weeks. 
Out of 430 persons, the court excused 268 because of having 
fixed opinions about Irvin's guilt. Eight of the 12 
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ultimately picked said they thought Irvin was guilty and 
that they were familiar with the facts and circumstances of 
the case. Irvin was convicted and sentenced to death. But 
after a series of appeals, the case reached the Supreme 
Court. 
The Court concluded that Irvin had not been given a 
fair and impartial trial, that he should have been granted a 
second change of venue and that, in the circustances of the 
case, it was the duty of the United States Court of Appeals 
to evaluate independently the voir dire testimony of the 
jurors.255 
Justice Clark, who wrote the majortiy opinion, remanded 
the case to lower courts for retrial, and highlighted 
certain principles regarding jurors and pretrial publicity. 
He stated that it is not required that jurors be totally 
ignorant of the facts and issues involved in a case. He 
wrote: 
To hold that the mere existence of any pre-
conceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of 
an accused is sufficient to rebut the prescription 
of a prospective juror's impartiali~y would be to 
establish an impossible standard.25 
Justice Clark also wrote that the facts of the case 
showed a clear pattern of prejudice. The patterns of the 
daily popular news media were "singularly revealing," and 
coverage had been such that prejudice in the minds of jurors 
was difficult to remove.257 
The Justice continued: 
It would be difficult to say that each would 
exclude this preconception of guilt from his 
deliberations. The influence that lurks in an 
opinion once formed is so persistent that it 
unconsciously fights detachment from the mental 
processes of the average man.258 
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Clark also stressed the responsibility of the press in 
covering a case in which a man's life is at stake. While 
emphasizing the need for an "undisturbed atmosphere" the 
Justice wrote: 
With his life at stake, it is not requiring too 
much that petitioner be tried in an atmosphere 
undisturbed by so huge a wave of public passion 
and be a jury other than one in which two thirds 
of the members admit, before hearing any t~5~i­
mony, to possessing a belief in his guilt. 
Justice Felix Frankfurter was against the media in his 
concurring opinion. He deplored the miscarriage of justice 
caused by trial by the news media. Justice Frankfurter 
wrote: 
The Court has not yet decided that the fair 
administration of justice must be subordinated to 
another safeguard of the constitutional s255em 
Freedom of the Press, properly conceived. 
The Irvin case and the subsequent judgment by the 
Supreme Court provided attorneys, various bar groups, and 
critics of the media a big weapon against the media's 
presence in court proceedings during both pretrial hearings 
and actual trials.261 
In addition,the case provided defense attorneys a 
useful precedent for appealing lower court convictions of 
their clients. Lower federal and state courts, in attemp-
ting to follow this case, also have presumed bias on the 
part of jurors in cases where publicity had been widepread 
and particularly vindictive. 262 
As for Irwin himself, he was letter retried by the 
State in a less emotional atmosphere, found guilty and 
sentenced to life imprisonment. 
Rideau V. Louisiana (373 U.S. 723, 1963) 
73 
Wilbert Rideau, a 1961 murder suspect arrested in Lake 
Charles, Louisiana, was taken to the Calcasien Parish jail 
without any advice of his rights about making statements or 
having a lawyer. On the night of arrest Rideau allegedly 
confessed the crimes, still without advice of his rights and 
without counsel. Five days later, he was interviewed by the 
FBI agents and confessed again. 
The following morning, Rideau was interviewed again by 
the Sheriff, FBI agents, and two policemen. The interview 
was recorded and later televised. It was claimed the case 
involved a 20 minute television film shown three times to 
viewing audiences estimated at 24,000 and 53,000 in a parish 
of 150,000 persons.263 Rideau was subsequently charged, 
convicted of murder, and sentenced to death. 
Rideau's lawyers appealed the decision. They argued 
that the defense motion for a charge was improperly denied, 
that specific jurors were wrongly allowed to be seated, and 
that television broadcasts made a fair trial impossible. 
Three jurors admitted seeing the televised interview at 
least once; but all jurors had testified they could set 
aside their opinions, and judge the case on the evidence 
alone. 
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The Louisiana State Supreme Court upheld the conviction 
on the grounds that Rideau failed to prove sufficient 
prejudice to warrant a mistrial. However, the U.S. Supreme 
Court, in a 7-to-2 decision, reversed Rideau's conviction. 
Justice Stewart, who delivered the opinion of the 
court, wrote that the "Kangaroo court proceedings in this 
case involved a more subtle but no less real deprivation of 
the due process of law."264 
Justice Stewart stated: 
For anyone who has ever watched television,the 
conclusion cannot be avoided that this spectacle, 
to the tens of thousands of people who saw and 
heard it, in a very real sense was Rideau's trial 
... at which he pleaded guilty to murder. Any 
subsequent court proceedings in a community so 
pervasively exposed to ~g§h a spectacle could be 
but a hollow formality. 
Justice Clark, with whom Justice Harlan joins, dis-
senting said: 
I agree fully with the Court that one is deprived 
of due process of law when he is tried in an 
environment so permeated with hostility that 
judicial prgceedings can be but a hollow 
formality.2 6 
The Justice went on that the principles established in 
this case deviated from the principles established in Irvin 
V. Dowd. He argued that unless the adverse publicity is 
shown by the record to have fatally infected the trial, 
there is simply no basis for the court's inference that the 
publicity, epitomized by the televised interview, called up 
some informal and illicit analogy to making petitioner's 
trial a meaningless formality.267 
Sheppard!:_ Maxwell (384 U.S . .11l.i_ 1966) 
Marilyn Sheppard, wife of Dr. Sam Sheppard, was blud-
geoned to death in their home in a Cleveland, Ohio suburb. 
From the outset officials focused suspicion on Sheppard 
because of the different accounts of what he said happened 
the day of the murder. After a search of the house and 
premises on the morning of the tragedy, the coroner was 
reported to have told his men, "Well it is evident the 
doctor did this, so let's go get the confession out of 
him."268 
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This case became one of the most highly publicized 
trials in history. Sheppard was formally accused of the 
crime and pleaded not guilty. The media thrust itself into 
the investigation of the crime and the trial. Massive 
coverage, bedlam at the trial, and prejudicial comments by 
public officials were held to have denied the defendant a 
fair trial.269 
The news media played up Sheppard's refusal to take a 
lie detector test and ''the protective ring" thrown up by his 
family. Front page newspaper headlines announced on the 
same day that "Doctor Balks at Lie Test; Retells Story." A 
column opposite that story had an "exclusive" interview with 
Sheppard headlined: "Loved My Wife - She Loved Me, Sheppard 
Tells Newspaper Reporters". The next day another story 
reported Sheppard had "again late yesterday refused to take 
a lie detector test" and quoted an Assistant County Attorney 
as saying that " ... at the end of a nine-hour questioning 
of Dr. Sheppard, I felt he was now ruling a test out 
completely."~70 
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Radio and television broadcasts of the developments in 
the murder investigation offered coverage similar to that of 
print "in condeming the suspect as the 'killer' ."271 
The Cleveland Press, the largest paper in Ohio at that 
time with a circulatin of 310,000, used the Sheppard case as 
its lead, page-one story on each of the 23 days before 
Sheppard's arrest. For three days it ran front-page 
editorials on the case. On at least three occasions, news 
of the murder and subsequent events consumed nearly all of 
page one and several inside pages. 272 
Newsweek magazine described the salient aspects of the 
Sheppard case: 
Sensational or sociology, the story of Dr. Sam 
Sheppard has consumed an astonishing amount of 
newsprint. One third to one half of the nation's 
newspapers were front paging daily developments. 
The story hit 90 percent of the front ~7§es the 
day Sheppard was convicted for murder. 
An inquest was held in a gymnasium on July 20, 1954 
attended by several media representatives. Microphone, 
camera, and television cable wires covered the floor of the 
gymnasium. Microphones were placed on the coroner's seat 
and the witness stand. Additional television lights were at 
strategic locations.274 
Sheppard was arrested July 30, on a charge of murder. 
The publicity described earlier continued until his indict-
ment August 17. 
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It was with this background that the case came to 
trial. The first row in the courtroom was occupied by 
representatives of radio and television stations, and the 
second and third rows by reporters from out-of-town and 
local newspapers, and magazines. Newscasts and special 
features were aired regularly about the trial. Station WSRS 
even was permitted to set up broadcasting facilities on the 
third floor of the courthouse next door to the jury room, 
where the jury rested during recesses in the trial and 
deliberated. Newscasts were made from this room throughout 
the trial, and while the jury reached its verdict. Hence it 
was no surprise when every juror, except one, testified at 
voir dire to have heard news broadcasts, seen TV films, or 
read about the case in the newspapers.275 
The intense publicity given the Sheppard case in the 
news media continued unabated while the trial was in 
progress. On the sidewalk and steps in front of the 
courthouse, television and newsreel cameras were used to 
take pictures of the participants in the trial, including 
the jury and the judge.276 
A debate among media representatives was staged and 
broadcast live over WHK radio station in Cleveland. The 
debate contained assertions that Sheppard had admitted his 
guilt by hiring a prominent criminal lawyer. It also was 
made known in one of WHK radio broadcasts about the case 
that a woman under arrest in New York City for robbery had 
admitted bieng Sheppard's mistress and had borne him a 
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child. Two jurors later admitted in open court that they 
had heard the broadcast. Sheppard's counsel objected to 
such broadcasts, but trial Judge Edward Blythin, the pre-
siding judge, denied the motion saying that such broadcasts 
would have no effect on the jury's judgment.277 
The Common Pleas Court convicted Sheppard of murder in 
1954. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals 
at Cuyahoga County, Ohio, and later by the Ohio Supreme 
Court. However, the Supreme Court of the United States 
reversed the judgment in 1966 on grounds that Sheppard did 
not receive a fair trial. A retrial was ordered and 
Sheppard was acquitted. 
Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the court and 
stated that the legal procedures in a criminal case included 
a requirement that the jury's verdict be based on evidence 
received in open court, not from outside sources. In 
Marshall V. United States, the Court set aside a federal 
conviction after the jurors were exposed through news 
accounts, to information not admitted in the trial.278 
Jutice Clark indicated a bias may have been possible 
among the jury when he wrote: 
The Sheppard jurors were subjected to newspaper, 
radio and television coverage of the trial while 
not taking part in the proceedings. The were 
allowed to go their separate ways outside of the 
courtroom, without adequate directions not 21§ read 
or listen to anything concerning the case. 
The Supreme Court Judge wrote that Judge Blythin's 
arrangements with the media "caused Sheppard to be deprived 
of that judicial serenity and calm to which he was 
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entitled." He pointed out that "bedlam reigned at the 
courthouse during the trial and newsmen took over practical-
ly the entire courtroom, hounding most of the participants 
in the trial, especially Sheppard. 11 280 
Justice Clark worte: 
The carnival atmosphere at trial could easily have 
been avoided since the courtroom and courthouse 
premises are subject to the control of the court. 
As we stressed in Estes, the presence of the press 
at judicial proceedings must be limited when it is 
apparent that the accused might otherwise be 
prejudiced or disadvantaged. Bearing in mind the 
massive pretrial publicity, the judge should have 
adapted stricter rules governing the use of the 
courtroom by newsmen, as Sheppard's counsel 
requested.2tl1 
Although the conduct of the news media was highly 
deplored and disapproved of in this case by the Chief 
Justice, he did note that it was the traditional freedom of 
the media to report about the process of justice. He said: 
The principle that justice cannot survive behind 
walls of silence has long been reflected in the 
"Anglo-American distrust for secret trials. A 
responsible press has always been regarded as the 
hand maiden of effective judicial administration, 
especially in the criminal field. The press does 
not simply publish information about trials but 
guards against the miscarriage of justice by 
subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial 
processes to extensive public scrutiny and criti-
cism.282 
Michael T. Callahan V. Russell E. Lash 
llli ~ Supp. 827 197) 
Like the Estes and Sheppard cases, this case also had 
excessive media publicity about the defendant which the 
Indiana State Supreme Court admitted deprived the defendant 
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of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial as demanded by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
It also marked the first time a State Supreme Court 
thoroughly documented numerous situations in which tele-
vising court proceedings can cause an unfair trial. 283 
Michael Callahan was indicted and found guilty by a 
jury of the 1961 murder of officer Edward G. Byrne of Marion 
County, Indiana, and obstructing the sheriff's staff in the 
perpetration of a burglary. Following judgment and senten-
cing the State Supreme Court later decided in 1974 to look 
at the case after denials of numerous petitions by the lower 
courts. 
The court granted a writ of certiorari and ordered the 
petitioner be discharged from custody based on evidence of 
facts that the State trial judge did not fulfill his duty to 
protect petitioner Callahan from the "inherently prejudicial 
publicity which saturated the community. 11 284 
The prejudicial publicity referred to television and 
print coverage of the case. There was testimony of flash-
bulbs popping, photographers moving around "behind the 
jury - behind the judges bench;" television cameras all over 
the courtroom with intense lights shown on trial partici-
pants. Citing Estes and Sheppard the court concluded that 
"Petitioner's trial did not comport with the fundamental 
conception of a fair tria1. 11 285 
The Court documented situations in which electronic 
coverage of court proceedings can cause an unfair trial, 
some so subtle as to defy detection by the accused or 
control by the judge, such as: 
1. Improperly influencing jurors by emphasizing 
the notoriety of the trial and affecting their 
impartial judgment, distracting their atten-
tion, making it possible for an unsequestered 
juror to see selected portions of the testi-
money reemphasized on television news pro-
grams, and improperly influencing potential 
jurors and this jeopardizing the fairness of 
new trials; 
2. Impairing the testimony of witnesses, as by 
causing some to be frightened and others to 
overstate their testimony, generally influ-
encing the testimony of witnesses, and frus-
trating any separation of witnesses by having 
any one or more of them watch a preceding 
witness on television even if they were 
admonished not to do so; 
3. Distracting judges generally and exerc1s1ng an 
adverse psychological effect, particularly 
upon those who are elected; and 
4. Imposing pressures upon the defendant and 
intruding into the confidential attorney-
client relationship with the eye of the tele-
vision camera.286 
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The court also pointed out in a footnote that televised 
jurors cannot help but feel the pressures of knowing that 
friends and neighbors have their eyes upon them. If the 
community be hostile to an accused, a televised juror, 
realizing that he must return to neighbors who saw the trial 
themselves, "may well be led not to hold the balance nice, 
clear and true between the State and the accused ... 287 
Indiana has no court rules or statutes as of the time 
of writing allowing broadcast coverage of court 
proceedings.288 
Richmond Newspapers et. al. Y....:._ Virginia 
et. al. (448 U.S. 555, 1980) 
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The electronic coverage of court proceedings as well as 
print coverage greatly depends on its legal justifications. 
In a 1979 decision the Supreme Court in Gannett V. De 
Pasquale (443 U.S. 368, 1979) justified the closure of 
pretrial proceedings - saying the Sixth Amendment guarantees 
of a public trial is for the benefit of the defendant alone; 
and closure of pretrial proceedings is often one of the most 
effective methods that a trial judge can employ to ensure 
that the fairness of a trial will not be jeopardized by the 
dissemination of such information before the trial has even 
begun.289 
The Supreme Court addressed the question of actual 
trial coverage in the Richmond Newspapers V. Virginia case. 
Defense attorneys for a defendant who was on trial for 
murder for the fourth time asked the judge to close trial 
proceedings from the public and the trial judge ordered the 
courtrooms closed except to those who would testify in the 
trial. The Richmond newspapers appealed to the Virginia 
Supreme Court after a petition to reverse the closure order 
was denied by the presiding judge, but did not succeed in 
opening the proceedings. However, the Supreme Court of the 
United States reversed the order, concluding that the right 
of the news media and the public to attend criminal trials 
is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendment.290 
83 
Chief Justice Burger who wrote the opinion of the 
court, pointed out that dissemination of information to the 
public guards against the government presenting a one-sided 
message of its case. 
The First Amendment goes beyond protection of the 
press and self-expression to prohibit the 
government from limiting the stock of information 
from which members of the public may deserve. 2 ~ 1 
The Court also examined historical evidence which 
offered proof that open trials are indeed beneficial to 
society. A public trial leads to a better understanding of 
the judicial system and reduces public hostility toward the 
defendant. Without publicity, all other checks are insuffi-
cient; in comparison to publicity, all other checks are of 
small account, wrote Justice Burger.292 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
As the conflict between the principles of Free Press 
and Fair Trial (Free Press here includes the electronic 
media) drags on, legal scholars and communication spe-
cialists have conducted studies in simulated as well as 
actual environments looking for proofs of both advantages 
and adverse effects of the media's presence in the court-
rooms. 
Various studies have examined relationships between 
jury verdicts and pretrial publicity, trial participants 
behavior under the presence of cameras in courts and their 
behavior when the electronic media is barred from the trial 
proceedings. The scholar's quest for empiriGal evidence and 
data have resulted in a large volume of literature per-
taining to the Free Press - Fair Trial Controversy in 
general. 
Various bar and media groups have conducted experiments 
and surveys to explore the impact of electronic coverage on 
trial participants other than the defendants. The Florida 
pilot program itself was a type of study and its results 
were collected in a post-program survey of participants. 
Although some of the research done was "non-scientific" and 
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produced limited data, the available data do not support the 
proposition that, in every case and in all circumstances, 
electronic coverage creates a significant adverse effect 
upon the participants in trials, at least not one uniquely 
associated with electronic coverage as opposed to more 
traditional forms of coverage. 1 
Further research may change the above statement but at 
present there is no unimpeachable empirical data to support 
the thesis that the presence of the electronic media 
interferes with trial proceedings. 
The author will report upon some of the studies which 
emphasize the presence of the electronic media. 
Philip Edward Berk Study 
Berk at the University of Iowa traced the background 
and history of Canon 35 and the controversy surrounding it, 
quoting extensively from the many arguments pro and con. 
He established four distinct types of viewpoints toward 
Canon 35 as applied to the free press - fair trial conflict. 
For professional reasons he found that journalists tend 
to favor ''freedom of the press," and lawyers express a 
strong preference for "fair trial." As for the lay public, 
with no professional interest to be served, Berk found that 
persons who had participated in a well-run trial covered 
properly by the mass media are more sympathetic toward free 
press. Conversely, antipathy toward the press in general 
and cameras in particular were expressed frequently by 
persons with limited or no experience of court coverage by 
photographers and electronic media reporters.2 
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On the strong possibility of significant correlation 
between experiences and attitudes the researcher used the Q-
methodology to confront individuals with a sample of self-
referent statements concerning the issue. Each person 
sorted the statements to indicate which of the statements he 
felt strongly about and those about which he did not feel 
strongly. Through the use of factor analysis the researcher 
was able to indicate the four distinct factors discussed 
above.3 
The Florida Survey 
At the conclusion of Florida's experimental year of 
camera access, the state supreme court commissioned a survey 
of participants and circuit judges in trials covered by 
electronic media. The survey is the most extensive measure-
ment ever attempted, and the Florida Supreme Court expressly 
relied on the results in its deliberations. The court 
cautioned that "the survey results are nonscientific and 
reflect only the respondents' attitudes and perceptions."4 
The Office of the State Courts Administrators dis-
tributed questionnaires to witnesses, jurors, attorneys, and 
court personnel. Two-thirds of those in each category 
responded. The total of respondents was 1,349, and placed 
the error at slightly under two percent. "A sample of 250 
allows one to predict the population characteristics with an 
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error estimate of plus or minus 3 percent. Quadrupling the 
sample to 1,000 respondents would increase the accuracy to 
slightly under 2 percent. 11 5 
The Florida results showed that court personnel and 
attorneys generally were less favorable toward cameras than 
witnesses and jurors. Forty percent of the attorneys 
thought the camera made other attorneys "nervous," while a 
third also rejected the opinion that attorneys were more 
attentive. On the effects of photographic equipment on 
jurors ability to judge the truthfulness of a witness, three 
to eight percent said they were somewhat hindered, four to 
eight percent reported they were helped. Among witnesses, 
more than half reported that the equipment made them self-
conscious. But in another response more than a third said 
they felt responsible for their actions because of the 
camera's presence.6 
In direct comparison with the print media, television 
fared no better and no worse with the respondents. 
Witnesses were asked if they were "concerned that someone 
may try to harm them because of their appearance as a 
witness being on television?" About 29 percent said yes, 
and 28 percent said they feared the same danger from being 
in the newspapers. When jurors were asked if they had been 
concerned that people would know they were serving on a 
particular jury and try to influence their decision as a 
result of the newspaper coverage of the trial, 14 percent 
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responded negatively, and 18 percent responded positively if 
it was on television.7 
The Conference of Circuit judges also surveyed its 286 
members with 155 responding. Results showed a slight 
plurality of the responding judges favored the pilot program 
with 36 percent positive, 28 percent negative, and 36 
percent neutral. However, comments that accompanied the 
survey responses showed that the neutrals generally made 
favorable comments.8 
In addition, an overwhelming majority of judges 
believed that jurors "(65 to 3), witnesses (68 to 9), and 
lawyers (84 to 2), were not swayed, impaired, or failed to 
conduct themselves in accord with the dictates of law when 
cameras were present."9 
In another survey conducted by a circuit judge and 
three university professors, of the Circuit and County court 
judges, similar results of judges favoring the presence of 
cameras in court was recorded. The survey had 130 responses 
from 286 circuit judges and 101 responses from 181 county 
judges. The results were 87.8 percent of the circuit judges 
responding perceived no serious trial disruptions while only 
12.2 percent perceived problems, thereby indicating the 
circuit judges favorable reactions to the presence of 
cameras. 10 
A substantial majority of the judges also felt that 
jurors (36 to 11), were not distracted. 11 
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They showed that witnesses (32 to 15), and defendants 
(38 to 9), cannot be easily distracted nor adversely 
affected by the presence of cameras in courtrooms. 12 
On the matter of lawyers playing to the camera and/or 
grandstanding, the judges (36 to 15), pointed out that is 
not enough to keep cameras out of the courts. 13 
that: 
The researchers who conducted the survey concluded 
Most judges who reject cameras in the courtroom do 
so on the philosophical grounds that justices must 
satisfy the appearance of justice. They believe 
that our system of law must prevent even the 
possibility of unfairness to a defendant. They 
are not yet convinced that cameras do not have a 
prejudicial effect on jurors and witnesses. 14 
Overall camera access scored impressively high. One 
question asked in all surveys was: "Would you favor or 
oppose allowing television, photographic, or radio coverage 
in the courtroom?" Those responding favorably or with no 
opinion were 73 percent of the jurors, 64 percent of the 
witnesses, 58 percent of the court personnel including 
judges, and 58 percent of the attorneys. 15 
The results of Florida's pilot program illustrate 
vividly that cameras in the courtroom have undergone various 
tests in the minds and opinions of the trial participants 
and have withstood a year's scrutiny. Critics response to 
these statistics blames it for being unreliable and unscien-
tific. But most judges that have presided over televised 
trials have been favorable to it and had expressed support 
on its use. A critic has it that surveys measure only 
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attitudes and perceptions not behavior. He suggested that 
witnesses and jurors might ''subconsciously" be bothered or 
distracted by a camera. 16 
James L. Hoyt 
A remark made by two U.S. Supreme Court Justices 
suggesting that during televised trials witnesses memories 
may fail and the accuracy of their statements may diminish 
prompted Dr. James Hoyt of the University of Wisconsin to 
experimentally test such speculation. He sought to deter-
mine if individuals were affected by the awareness that they 
are being televised. 
Subjects were 36 volunteers enrolled in a "media and 
society" class at the professor's university. 
The study simulated some of the pressures placed on 
witnesses in a courtroom setting while at the same time 
maintaining experimental control so that results could be 
meaningfully analyzed. Subjects were shown a film con-
taining detailed information and were later interviewed 
about the contents of the film. While answering questions, 
subjects were either facing a conspicuous television camera 
purportedly recording their answers and were told it would 
be viewed by a large audience; in the other setting an 
unobtrusive camera hidden behind a mirror was used so it 
would not be seen from the respondents' chair. In the 
unobtrusive camera condition setting, the experimenter 
included as a final part of instructions that the video 
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tapes of the recording will be used as part of a follow-up 
study which would be viewed by a larger number of people. 
This was done to add to the realism of the setting, causing 
the participants to actually believe that their performance 
would be seen by others. 
In the unobtrusive camera condition the same instruc-
tions were given except they reported there was a television 
camera operating behind the two-way mirror placed in front 
of the respondents, but in reality there was none at all. 
The awareness of a hidden camera was created because the 
experimenter felt it was important to create the same belief 
that even though there was no camera, just as in an actual 
courtroom situation, the participants should be aware that 
their answers would be widely circulated even though not 
electronically recorded in the courtroom. 
Each subject was later asked six specific questions 
about the content of the film. The questions and answers 
were recorded for subsequent analysis on an audio cassette 
recorder hidden from the subjects' view. The questions were 
developed and pre-tested for clarity, precision, and compre-
hensivenes~ and all testing was completed within four days 
to minimize chances of discussion among participants who 
were instructed not to discuss the study with their class-
mates. 
Coders carefully listened to the audio tapes of the 
answers, coding a number of items, both in terms of speech 
characteristics and contents such as total time used in 
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talking, time used from end of question until start of 
answers and the number of times each asked for clarifica-
tion. 
The experimenter said those subjects who faced the 
obtrusive television camera included more correct informa-
tion in their answers (F = 4.63, df = 2133, p < .025). 17 
The mean amount of correct information contained in all six 
answers for those in the obtrusive camera condition was 
20.17, compared to 16.33 for those in the hidden camera 
condition and 16.83 for those who faced no television 
camera. 18 
On the length of answers, subjects in the obtrusive 
camera condition behaved differently. They spoke for a 
longer time in answering the questions than did the subjects 
in other settings. (F = 5.35, df = 2133, p < .01). Their 
mean total answer length was 36.50 seconds, compared to 
28.21 seconds for those facing the hidden camera and 29.71 
seconds for those not confronting a camera at all. 19 
Hoyt found no significant differences in the respon-
dents' verbal behavior when confronted with a hidden televi-
sion camera as compared to when no camera was present. 20 
Hence the assumption that when faced by a television camera, 
person's memories may fail, they may talk differently or 
talk slowly was not supported.21 He wrote: 
If the television camera was hidden from the sight 
of the witness, the presence of the camera seemed 
to be irrelavent. It was as if when the camera 
was out of sight it was also out of their thoughts 
and concerns.22 
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Hoyt also pointed out that those subjects who faced the 
obtrusive television camera gave more correct information in 
their answers and spoke for a longer period of time in 
answering their questions than did those in the other 
settings.23 He said: 
In a closely related measure, subjects in the 
obtrusive camera condition also used more words in 
composing their answers then did subjects in the 
other conditions CF= 4.96, df = 2123, p < .025). 
The mean number of words for those facing the 
obvious camera was 70.25, for those facing the 
hidden camera was 60.50, ~Ud for those not facing 
a camera was 56.17 words. 
Hoyt noted that people "apparently" feel more compelled 
to speak more and to pause less when they are conspicuously 
aware they are being televised. He stated that the longer 
answers given by those in front of the cameras did not 
contain additional incorrect information. They contained 
significantly more correct information directly relevant to 
the questions. It is this finding he said that has the 
broadest implications for courtroom coverage by 
television.25 
Hoyt concluded that his data in this context indicates 
that far from being a danger and a potential hindrance to a 
fair trial, television cameras can lead to a fairer trial 
because the witness could be expected to offer more complete 
and correct information in response to the questions from 
the various attorneys and both sides should be able to 
benefit from the increased information on which the court's 
decision could be reached. 26 
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The researcher however cautioned that this study was 
only an experimental approximation of some of the key 
aspects of the courtroom environment and not a trial itself. 
He said "What the current study did was to provide some 
original systematic data bearing on the significant overall 
question of the effects of camera coverage of courtroom 
trials. 11 27 
Shores Donald Lewis, Jr., Study 
Shores Donald Lewis in his doctoral dissertation looked 
into the effects of courtroom cameras on verbal behavior and 
specifically investigated the effects of the presence of a 
television camera on the content of trial witness testimony. 
His study also investigated possible effects of the televi-
sion camera's presence on the ability of witnesses to 
present cogent testimony. 28 
The researcher embarked on his scientific study by 
obtaining testimony from 58 college - aged subjects during a 
simulated trial in an actual courtroom. The testimony was 
analyzed to determine 
the type-token ratio, mean word length, average 
word frequency of the first 100 words of each 
subject's testimony, the total adjusted length of 
the testimony, and the ratio of trivial words used 
to the total number of words used by each 
subject.29 . 
However, significant (p < .05) main effects were found 
between vocabulary and average word frequency (p < .04), and 
between communication apprehension and total adjusted testi-
mony (p < .001). A significant interaction effect (p < .04) 
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existed between the camera situation and communication 
apprehension for the average word frequency of subjects.30 
The camera situation, communication apprehension 
scores, and vocabulary scores were his three independent 
variables. Through analysis of covariance the researcher 
found no statistically significant differences among the 
dependent variables between subjects testifying without the 
presence of cameras.31 
A self report instrument completed by subjects after 
testifying in the courtroom indicated "no-camera subjects 
perceived more distractions (10 of 26) in the courtroom 
while testifying than camera condition subjects (9 of 
32). 11 32 However, four individuals reported the television 
camera as a source of distraction which led the researcher 
to conclude: 
The television camera alone has no significant 
effect on the lexical diversity of testimony. 
An interaction of the camera situation with an 
individual's personal level of communication 
apprehension significantly affects that person's 
pattern of repeating words while testifying in the 
courtroom. 
A person's normal level of communication apprehen-
sion significantly affects his/her length of 
testimony. Individual's possessing higher levels 
of communication apprehension presented longer 
testimony than individua133with lower communica-tion apprehension scores. 
In simpler terms, the researcher found that a camera 
has no noticeable effect on the testimony of a trial 
participant. The way and manner testimony is given is not 
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slowed nor quickened by the presence of camera but is 
determined by an individual's normal level of communication. 
Gerald Kline and Paul Jess 
Kline, at the University of Minnesota, and Jess from 
South Dakota State University, hypothesized that certain 
news stories carried by both print and the electronic media 
affect trial participants, particularly the jury, in a civil 
case. 
Subjects were 48 male sophomore students divided into 
two groups and equated for college entrance scores and age. 
Variables were based on "prejudicial" and "non-prejudicial" 
versions of a traffic injury represented as a story run in 
the University daily newspaper and inserted in a simulated 
newscast. The prejudicial element involved a deplorable 
driving record and arrests for reckless, drunken driving and 
leaving the scene of an accident. The control group was 
exposed to non-prejudicial news stories. 
From the groups, four, six-man juries were selected 
through the voir dire proceeding and then sat through a mock 
trial. 
It was found that in each of the four trials, at least 
one member in each of the "prejudicial - element" juries 
made reference to the prejudicial information contained in 
the news stories.34 
The researchers suggested that the impact of a judge's 
instructions to the jury needed further exploration. 
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They also pointed out the drawbacks of the experiment 
such as the potency and nature of the trial arguments which 
were beyond their control. There is also the effects of 
simulated situation which can and often strained the linkage 
between experiment and reality.35 
Netteburg Kermit Lyol Study 
Lyol wished to find out if the televising of court 
proceedings engender hostility and incitement within the 
community against the defendant and possibly the court 
system. 
The researcher began to fill that void by examining 
responses to televised trials in two Wisconsin communities, 
one of which had had a great deal of court televising and 
another which had had little exposure to the use of cameras 
in its courtrooms. 
His general hypothesis was that respondents in the 
community with the greater televising activity would exhibit 
more of the prejudicial attributes of television causing 
mistrials and contributing to community incitement than 
respondents in the community with little exposure to televi-
sion in their courtrooms.36 
Sixty one separate questions or scales were analyzed to 
test whether the arguments about community incitement and 
television causing mistrials apply to 1980 courts. 
The researcher found that for 34 of those measures 56 
percent showed no significant difference existed between the 
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two communities, and for another 18 of these measures 29 
percent showed the significant difference was opposite the 
hypothesis about televising court trials. He also reported 
that in only nine instances or 15 percent did findings give 
significant support to the argument that televising court 
proceedings contributes to community incitement causing 
mistrials.37 
Lyol concluded from his data that using community 
incitement rationale as a continuing reason for banning 
cameras from courtrooms is unjust and baseless.38 
Warner Carl Hartenberger 
Hartenberger evaluated the controversy and suggested a 
resolution consistent with judicial rulings and media con-
tentions by adhering to a research plan that included: 
1. The nature and development of the constitutional 
principles in conflict. 
2. An examination of selected trial and congressional 
proceedings considered landmark cases in the 
development of the controversy. 
3. A review of the development, and present day use, 
of legislative, judicial and self-imposed factors 
of restraint.39 
Using these bases, Hartenberger found that the exclu-
sion of broadcast equipment from the courtrooms is an 
abridgement of the First Amendment rights and cannot be 
supported legally, historically, or ethically. He pointed 
1 1 2 
out that in the face of a conflict between the Constitu-
tional rights of the media and those of the defendant, the 
latter's rights are given precedence. 40 
Hartenberger concluded that as the role of the broad-
cast media becomes more entrenched in the every day activi-
ties of the people, a change in emphasis may occur that will 
lead the court to embrace the media as legitimate partners 
in trial proceedings.41 
Rita James Simon 
Simon looked for the effects of pretrial news reports 
carried by both print and electronic media on a jury's 
verdict. Simon also wanted to learn if a juror having seen 
a TV newscast or read a news report about a defendant can 
put that information aside and reach a verdict solely on the 
evidence he hears in court. In an attempt to answer these 
questions, Simon embarked on a pilot study involving a 
fictional trial. 
The researcher and her colleagues wrote two newspaper 
accounts of the same murder, one as it would be played by a 
conservative paper like the New York Times, the other as the 
sensational tabloids would handle it. The conservative 
story carried a sober account of the murder, with headlines 
of modest type size. The sensational stories headlines were 
of much larger type. 
Subjects were drawn randomly from the lsit of regis-
tered voters at Champaign and Urbana, Illinois. Sensational 
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news stories were given to 51 of the subjects and conserva-
tive clippings to 56. A verdict on the guilt or innocence 
was sought by a ballot. 
The experiment indicated that people were influenced by 
what they read and that sensational news coverage had more 
influence on the guilt verdict than sober accounts.42 
The researchers found that important changes occurred 
when subjects listened to a tape-recording of the "trial" of 
the accused that began with an admonition by the judge to 
lay aside any prior opinion and ideas on the case. Jurors 
again were asked to arrive at individual decisions on the 
guilt or innocence of the accused. This time most of the 
jurors changed their mind and found the defendant 
innocent.43 
The researcher added a note of warning that the 
subjects used in the study were not representative of the 
general population, and not typical of the average jury. 
They were primarily middle class subjects. About two-thirds 
of them were business people with a college education. 
Barber Susanna Ruth Study 
The study compared the U.S. Supreme Court's decison in 
Chandler V. Florida (1981) with the conclusions of histori-
cal, legal, and social scientific literature on the impact 
of cameras on the trial process and its participants. 44 
Ruth found that historical research shows that the 
American Bar Association rationale in adopting Canon 35 
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should be viewed skeptically since cameramen were not solely 
responsible for disrupting or prejudicing the Haupmann 
trial. 
Many cases such as those of Scopes, Haupmann, 
Zamora, Chandler and Granger, Herman and Bundy, 
were intrinsically sensational and newsworthy by 
virtue of tUe issues and or people involved in the 
litigation. 5 
The study also pointed out that empirical research 
examined by the Supreme Court showed no significant correla-
tion between the presence of cameras at a trial and 
perceived prejudicial behavior or attitudes on the part of 
jurors, witnesses, judges, or attorneys. But the court 
relied on the relevant social science research only to a 
limited degree frequently circumscribing its decision with 
reservations about the "scientific nature of the data, the 
validity of its conclusions, and the pervasiveness of its 
implications."46 
The researcher said a double standard may have been 
applied to broadcast versus print media trial coverage 
because courts are less prompt to reprimand print than 
broadcast media for transgressions such as the publication 
of contemptuous materials.47 
LawPoll Study 
LawPoll posed to its respondents seven conditions that 
have been or might be used with courtroom cameras. Lawyers 
who approved of televised proceedings were asked whether or 
not each of the conditions should be required, while those 
who disapproved of TV in courtrooms were queried as to 
whether the fulfillment of the conditions would make them 
more likely to approve. 
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They found that among the advocates of TV, the key 
prerequisite is the right of the presiding judge to termi-
nate it if it is found to be distracting (92 percent). The 
emphasis on the discretion of judges was reinforced by 63 
percent who felt that prior permission of the judge should 
be a requirement. Counsel's consent was less of a factor, 
as 46 percent indicated that consent of both attorneys 
should be a prerequisite.48 
On balance the protection of the defense through its 
consent was judged more necessary (44 percent) than the 
rights of the prosecution (25 percent). There was rela-
tively little endorsement of the need to secure the consent 
of witnesses (25 percent) and even less for limiting TV 
cameras to appellate courts. 49 
The situation was rather different among the opponents 
of TV in the courts, as 53 percent of this group said it 
would be more likely to endorse cameras if they were limited 
to appellate courts. For each of the other conditions, 
majorities ranging from 56 percent (judge's right to termi-
nate) to 92 percent (consent of the prosecution) indicated 
that they would be unswayed in their opposition to cameras 
in the court.50 
The positive and negative sides of televised proceed-
ings were presented in the form of six statements to which 
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respondents could agree or disagree. Three of the state-
ments described reasons permitting televsions in the courts, 
and three suggested why it would be inappropriate. 
Complementing the findings in the preceding section, 
respondents tended to accept the antitelevision statements 
and reject the favorable ones. By a 75-23 percent margin, 
they agreed that television would tend to distract wit-
nesses. Seventy percent believe that television would be 
used to show the more sensational aspects of a trial only, 
and 64 percent feel it would encourage lawyer and judicial 
grandstanding.51 
While the major concern of opponents of TV is its 
likely effect bn witnesses, it is generally agreed that the 
problem cannot be solved merely by allowing witnesses the 
right not be televised, as lawyers appear to believe that 
many witnesses will be distracted by the cameras without 
realizing it. 
There was only minority agreement with the positive 
aspects of television, as 37 percent accepted the contention 
that it would enhance the public concept of our system of 
justice, and 33 percent believed that citizens are entitled 
to see our courts in operation. The final statement, 
suggesting that barring television would be discriminatory, 
elicited only 20 percent support.52 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
Kerlinger in Foundations of Behavioral Research wrote 
about the adequacy of research design and methodology: 
An Investigator must carefully scrutinize the 
technical adequacy of the methods, the measure-
ments, and the statistics. We face here the 
obvious, but too easily overlooked, fact that 
adequacy of interpretation is dependent on each 
link in the methodological chain as well as the 
appropriateness of each link to the research 
problem. 1 
Since the over-all purpose of the study is to obtain 
attitudes of broadcast editors and lawyers in the state of 
Oklahoma towards the issue of Cameras in Courtrooms, the 
questions to be tested are: Are there differences between 
the attitudes of broadcast editors and attorneys at law 
towards the issue of television cameras in the courtroom? 
Is there a relation between one's role and one's attitude 
towards cameras in the courtroom? Do the broadcast editors 
as a group favor the presence of cameras in courtroom? Do 
the lawyers as a group favor the presence of cameras in 
courtroom? Does the length of time served as an editor make 
a difference in one's attitude towards the presence of 
cameras? 
Answers to these questions are sought in the belief 
they will be of value to broadcasting journalism and to the 
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bar. The study may produce information which could lead to 
acceptable and effective use of cameras in courtrooms. 
Shaw and Wright stated the significance of a study of 
attitudes. Attitudes significantly influence Man's response 
to cultural products, to other persons, and to groups of 
persons--to the extent that principle governing attitudes 
are known, they may be used to manipulate the individual's 
reactions to relevant objects.2 
Statement of Hypotheses 
Hypotheses are important and indispensible tools of 
scientific research. They are powerful tools for the 
advancement of knowledge because they enable man to get 
outside himself .3 Kerlinger, during the process of empha-
sizing the importance of hypotheses to a research experi-
ment, also laid down criteria for what he calls "good" 
hypotheses. He stressed that they must be statements about 
the relations between variables and also must carry clear 
implications for testing the stated relations.4 In other 
words, these criteria mean that hypothesis statements con-
tain two or more variables that are measurable or poten-
tially measurable and also specify how the variables are 
related. 
This study is designed to determine if significant 
differences exist between broadcast editors and attorneys at 
law in their attitudes towards cameras in courtrooms. 
Null Hypotheses 
The null hypotheses statements developed from the 
research questions are: 
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1. There is no significant difference between editors 
and attorneys (prosecutors and defense) in their 
attitude towards electronic coverage of court 
trials. 
2. There is no significant difference between defense 
attorneys and prosecuting attorneys in their atti-
tude towards electronic coverage of court trials. 
3. There is no significant difference between editors 
and prosecutors in their attitude towards the 
effects of publicity on the court trials. 
4. There is no significant difference between editors 
and attorneys (prosecution and defense) in their 
attitude towards the media's rights to inform the 
public - information rights. 
5. There is no significant difference between editors 
and attorneys (prosecution and defense) in their 
attitude towards the individual rights. 
6. There is no significant difference betweeen broad-
cast editors and defense attorneys in their atti-
tudes that electronic coverage of court trials 
influences the court's decisions. 
7. There is no significant difference between editors 
and attorneys (prosecution and defense) in their 
attitude towards media rights. 
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All broadcasting editors of all commercial television 
stations in the State of Oklahoma were sent questionnaires. 
The names of attorneys who were sent questionnaires were 
randomly selected from the Martindal Hubbel Law Directory. 
Since the editor in the news department of a broadcast 
station is ultimately responsible for the content of his 
broadcast, and, hence, decides what will be aired, the 
writer was concerned with this person's attitudes. 
Selection of Opinionnaire Items 
The first step taken in construction of an attitude 
scale was to obtain attitude statements that are widely 
representative of the issue.5 The broad criterion of 
"variable representativeness" stressed by Kerlinger must be 
kept in mind when selecting items. Variable representative-
ness means the items as a whole should be representative of 
the topic--the electronic coverage of court trials--and 
encompass all aspects of the controversy. 
A 20-item opinionnaire was formulated after a review of 
court cases, journal articles and books on the issue. These 
items were pretested for their consistency of measurement 
and two with low discriminatory power were eliminated. 
The remaining 18 items yielded a reliability coef-
ficient of .80 following a pretest conducted among subjects 
on the Oklahoma State University campus. 
Classification of Items 
The 18 items of the opinionnaire were separated into 
five categories of news effects. They were Publicity 
effects, Information function, Individual rights, Media 
influence and Media rights. 
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Four items in the opinionnaire dealt with the issue of 
publicity effects. They are items 1, 2, 5 and 7: 
Item 1: The presumption that television coverage of 
courtroom proceedings is biased and prejudi-
cial is based on conjecture rather than fact. 
Item 2: Previous causes of sensational publicity jus-
tify banning electronic media coverage of 
courtroom proceedings. 
Item 5: Television coverage of a trial singles out the 
defendant and adversely prejudices his case. 
Item 7: Witnesses are reluctant to testify because of 
fears of publicity created by television 
coverage. 
Two items dealt with the information function. These 
are items 3 and 4: 
Item }: Television coverage of court trials serves to 
allay public fears and dispel rumors during 
trials, and 
Item 4: Television coverage of court proceedings helps 
educate the public on what happens in a 
courtroom. 
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Five items dealt with individual rights. They are 
i terns 6, 8, 9, 10, and 17: 
Item 6: Television coverage reinforces the principle 
that a defendant is innocent until proven 
guilty. 
Item 8: Television coverage of trials serves the 
cause of justice in motivating witnesses to 
come forward to testify. 
Item 9: Television coverage of a trial denies the 
defendant a fair trial. 
Item 10: Fair trials are possible without placing 
restraints on television coverage. 
Item 17: Television coverage of a trial provides a 
more balanced and complete account of a court 
trial then any other media. 
Four items dealth with media influence. They are items 
11, 12, 13, and 18: 
Item 11: Television coverage of courtroom proceedings 
has no significant influence on jurors as 
often claimed. 
Item 12: The presence of television cameras in the 
courtroom influences jurors by emphasizing 
the notoriety of the trial. 
Item J]_: Both defense and prosecuting attorneys tend 
to show off for television cameras rather 
than concentrate on the case. 
Item 18: Television coverage of a trial over 
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dramatizes and gives the public a wrong 
impression of what actually tokes place in a 
trial. 
Three items dealt with media rights. They are items 
14, 15, and 16. 
Item 14: Television coverage of trials should be 
banned. 
Item 15: Barring television cameras from the court-
rooms violates television's First Amendment 
rights. 
Item 16: Television should be granted unlimited access 
to all judicial proceedings. 
Variables and Operational Definition 
Attitudes of broadcast editors and attorneys (prose-
cutors and defense) towards the issue of television cameras 
in courtrooms is the dependent variable. The more positive 
the attitude is toward television cameras in courtrooms, the 
more negative the attitude is towards its ban. 
An attitude has been defined as: "an enduring system 
of positive or negative evaluations, emotional feelings, and 
pro or con tendencies with respect to a social object. 11 6 
Thurstone also provides a physiological approach to 
defining the term "attitude." He defined it as the degree 
of positive or negative effect associated with some "Psycho-
logical Object. 11 7 
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Thurstone means any phrase, any symbol, slogan, person, 
institution, ideal or idea toward which people can differ 
with respect to positive or negative effect. 
To understand better the term "attitude", the following 
are general characteristics said to be possessed by atti-
tudes. 
Attitudes are based upon evaluation concepts regarding 
characteristics of the referent object and give rise to 
motivated behavior. 
Attitudes are learned, rather than being innate or a 
result of constitutional development and maturation. 
Attitudes possess varying degrees of interrelatedness 
to one another. 
Attitudes are relatively stable and enduring.8 
In this study, attitudes towards the controversy of 
having television cameras in courtrooms or not means the 
inclination to favor television coverage of court trials or 
not; and the extent to which the respondents look favorably 
upon the presence of television cameras in courtrooms. 
Methodology 
The methodology of this study centered on the 18-item 
opinionnaire constructed on a five point Likert rating 
scale. The scale, developed by Rensis Likert in 1932, 
comprises a set of attitude items which are considered of 
approximately equal attitude value. As in all attitude 
scales, the purpose of the Likert scale, otherwise known as 
128 
the "Summated rating scale," is to place an individual 
somewhere on an agreement continuum for the attitude in 
question.9 To each of the items presented, subjects respond 
with degrees of agreement. Each of the items in the scale 
were characterized by five degrees of response: (a) 
strongly agree, (b) agree, (c) neutral, (d) disagree, and 
(e) stongly disagree. The answers were scored so that the 
most favorable response was given the highest score (5), and 
the least favorable, the lowest score (1). A score of 3 
stands for neutral. This type of scale ratings gives 
greater variance. 
The Likert scale was chosen because of certain inherent 
advantages it is known to possess. The scale gives more 
intensity of attitude expression. Respondents can use any 
one of five categories: Strongly agree, agree, undecided 
(neutral), disagree, or strongly disagree. Because subjects 
can agree or disagree strongly, greater variance results. 10 
Another advantage of this rating system is that one 
item presumably is the same as any other item in attitude 
value. 11 The individual responding to items are scaled; and 
the scaling comes through sums of the individual's 
responses. 
Likert scales with less than 12 items have even yielded 
high reliability coefficients. Likert, himself, has 
acclaimed the method of summated ratings simple and easy to 
apply. 12 
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A type 1 two-factor mixed design with repeated measures 
on one factor was used to analyze the data. 
The type 1 design frequently is called upon in communi-
cation research in which different classes of people are 
asked to respond or rate different aspects of a mass media 
unit. 13 Type 1 is called a mixed design because the same 
respondents are asked to rate more than one aspect of a 
stimulus. Hence the repeated measures on one factor. 14 
Due to the unequalness of the data and method of 
research study (universe over sample) the type I two-factor 
mixed design was used in analyzing the data. 
Conduct of Survey 
The writer directed a mail out to each of the 19 
television broadcast editors in Oklahoma and to 79 attorneys 
(both prosecutors and defense) in Oklahoma City. Names of 
attorneys were randomly selected. Each envelope contained 
the following: 
1. One opinionnaires dealing with the electronic 
coverage of court trials. 
2. A cover letter stating the nature and purpose of 
the study. 
3. A self-addressed, stamped envelope. 
A follow-up letter was mailed to those who did not 
respond after three weeks. The writer also backed this up 
with numerous phone calls to their offices and homes to 
speed up response and returns. 
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CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS 
Study data was obtained from a Type 1 two factor mixed 
design with repeated measures on one factor of attitude 
scores in the opinionnaire. The study compared the atti-
tudes of attorneys - defense and prosecutors - and editors 
on different aspects of news effects on electronic coverage 
of court trials. These news effects are: Publicity 
Effects, Information Function, Individual Rights, Media 
Influence, and Media Rights. 
A mail survey yielded a 60.2 percent return; 59 of the 
98 opinionnaires were completed and returned. Seventeen 
broadcast editors, 28 defense attorneys, and 14 prosecuting 
attorneys responded. 
Each respondent registered his agreement on a five-
point Likert rating scale by checking spaces representing a) 
strongly agree, b) agree, c) neutral, d) disagree, and e) 
strongly disagree. 
Each respondent's answers were scored so that the most 
favorable responses were given the highest score of (5), and 
the least favorable, the lowest score (1). A score of 3 
represented neutral or undecided. 
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Analysis of Attitude Score 
Attitude by Type .£1:. Respondent 
The overall attitude of respondents (editors, defense 
attorneys and prosecutors) towards electronic coverage of 
court trials were very similar and indicate no significant 
difference. 
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As reported in Table I, the mean attitude score of 
editors was 3.01, prosecutors, 2.72 and defense attorneys, 
2.78. This indicates no significant difference in the 
respondents attitudes towards the overall issue of elec-
tronic coverage of courtroom trials. The attitudes of the 
prosecuting and defense attorneys were more alike than those 
of the editors. 
Hypothesis 1 which stated: There is no significant 
difference between editors and attorneys (prosecutors and 
defense) in their attitudes towards electronic coverage of 
courtroom trials, and Hypothesis 2 which stated: There is 
no significant difference between defense attorneys and 
prosecuting attorneys in their attitude towards electronic 
coverage of courtroom trials were confirmed. 
Atitudes by Categories of News Effects 
The difference between attitude mean score, by cate-
gories of news effects, (Publicity effects, Information 
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function, Individual rights, Media influence, Media rights) 
as shown in Table II were not significant (F:1.25, p.>.01.). 
TABLE I 
EDITORS, PROSECUTORS, AND DEFENSE ~TTORNEYS 
MEAN ATTITUDE SCORES TOWARDS ELECTRONIC 
COVERAGE OF COURT TRIALS 
Types of Personnel 
Editors 
Prosecutors 
Defense 
Mean Total 
Mean Scores 
3.01 
2.72 
2.78 
2.83 
The mean scores for all five categories range from 2.37 
(which is closer to disagree than neutral) for media rights 
to 3.29 for information function to produce a mean total of 
2.83 which is slightly below the undecided (neutral) rating 
of 3. In short, all of the news effects elicit neutral 
(undecided) responses from the respondents. 
The respondents neutral can be attributed to flexi-
bility of both groups. Their attitudes may change with 
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their vested interest. For instance, if publicity seems to 
favor the public prosecutor he might be inclined to view it 
as positive. The media might view the publicity as positive 
if coverage attracts large numbers of viewers. 
TABLE II 
RESPONDENTS MEAN ATTITUDE SCORES TOWARDS 
ELECTRONIC COVERAGE OF COURT TRIALS 
BY CATEGORIES OF NEWS EFFECTS 
Categories of News Effects Mean Scores 
Publicity Effects 2.94 
Information Function 3.29 
Individual Rights 2.64 
Media Influence 2.93 
Media Rights 2.37 
Mean Total 2.83 
NOTE: Criticial difference between mean 
scores= 1.18 
On the other hand a prosecutor or defense attorney 
might have a negative attitude if publicity is believed to 
adversely affect their case and the course of justice. 
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Attitude by News Effects: 
Respondents Interests 
Although there were no significant differences for 
between personnel types and between categories; interraction 
between personnel types and categories of news effects is 
significant (F:2.79, p.<.01). 
That meant the attitude toward the different news 
effects of cameras in courtroom greatly depends on the type 
of each respondents professional interest. The findings 
reject Null Hypothesis number 4 that: There is no sig-
nificant difference between editors and attorneys in their 
attitude towards the media's rights to inform the public 
(information rights). 
As shown in Table III , editors mean score of 4.50 in 
the information news effect category has the highest mean 
score in the entire table, this indicates a very favorable 
attitude towards the information category news effect. 
Broadcast Editors did not express a very strong overall 
positive attitude. This is borne out by the fact that there 
exists no significant difference with a higher mean score 
towards the right of the media (3.01) and other categories 
in their favor except the Information category which is 
higher with a mean score of 4.50. Such an attitude may 
possibly reflect a balanced fair attitude on the part of 
journalists in general and the respondents to this opinion-
naire in particular. 
TABLE III 
EDITORS, PROSECUTORS AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS MEAN ATTITUDE 
SCORES TOWARDS ELECTRONIC COVERAGE OF COURT TRIALS 
BY CATEGORIES OF NEWS EFFECTS 
CATEGORIES OF NEWS EFFECTS 
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Types of Publicity Information Individual Media Media 
Personnel Effects Function Rights Influence Rights 
Editors 2.38 4.50 3.30 2.10 
Defense 
Attorneys 3.44 2.28 2.22 3.44 
Prosecuting 
Attorneys 3.00 3. 10 2.50 3.25 
Mean Totals 2.94 3.29 2.64 2.93 
NOTE: The Critical Difference between vertical or 
horizontal means: 1.54, p.<.01. 
3.01 
2.72 
2.78 
2.83 
In other words, based on the high mean score of 4.50 
all the editors that responded to the opinionnaire show a 
strong favorable attitude toward the informational function 
on the use of cameras in courtroom trials (electro.nic 
coverage of court trials) as a communication means of 
educating the public on what happens in a courtroom and also 
as a medium that helps in allaying public fears and dispel 
rumors during trials and what goes on in a courthouse. 
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Both defense and prosecuting attorneys responded nega-
tively to the information function of the opinionnaire. The 
defense attorney has a mean score of 2.28, more toward 
disagree than neutral (while the prosecuting attorney by a 
slight difference gave a mean score of 3.10). With such a 
slight difference, it is safe to note that both attorneys do 
not support the notion that television coverage of court 
trials serves an information function in helping to educate 
the public on what happens in a courtroom; or serves to 
allay public fears and dispel rumor during trials. 
It should however be pointed out that the mean attitude 
scores of the defense attorneys for both the publicity and 
media influence categories was the same at 3.44, which were 
the highest for these items in the survey. 
The items scored highly by the defense attorneys 
concerns the issue of media publicity in sensational cases, 
the problem of attorneys grandstanding in front of cameras 
and others. 
However, not all attorneys are alike. The prosecutors 
mean attitude scores toward all the five categories were 
below negative or very slight above the undecided (neutral) 
level of three. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, 
AND CONCLUSION 
The conflict between the right to a free media and the 
right to a fair trial is confusing and perplexing; it is not 
a case of good against evil, but two rights guaranteed by 
the Constitution which at times oppose each other. 
G.K. Chesterton, an English poet and author, once wrote 
of the issue: "It's competition not between right and wrong 
but between right and right." 1 
This study has attempted to gauge the attitudes of 
broadcast editors (television) and lawyers (prosecutors and 
defense attorneys) in Oklahoma towards electronic coverage 
of court proceedings. The analysis of the data showed that 
editors and lawyers (both prosecutors and defense attoneys) 
were chiefly concerned with the issues on electronic 
coverage of court proceedings. However, the groups tend to 
favor issues supporting their vested interests. 
Example: Editors believed that the electronic coverage 
of court trials ensures the defendant a fair trial and 
serves as an informational function in educating the public 
on what goes on in a courtroom and also helps in allaying 
public fears and dispelling rumors during trials. The 
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attorneys on the other hand believed otherwise, claiming 
media coverage (television) overpublicizes court trials and 
prejudices their clients case. 
A Type 1 analysis of variance was used in this study 
which is primarily concerned with comparing the attitudes of 
broadcast editors to those of prosecuting and defense 
attorneys about different aspects of the electronic media's 
influence on court trials. 
The three groups, editors, defense and prosecuting 
attorneys, in this study were asked to respond to different 
categories of news effects on electronic coverage of court 
trials. These news effects are: Publicity Effects, Infor-
mation Function, Individual Rights, Media Influence, and 
Media Rights. 
The analysis showed the F ratio for between types of 
personnel at 2 by 56 degrees of freedom is 6.64 and not 
significant at either the 0.05 or 0.01 level of confidence. 
The null hypothesis was accepted that there is no signifi-
cant difference between editors and attorneys (prosecutors 
and defense) in their overall attitude towards the effect of 
electronic coverage of court trials. By implication the 
author infered that the overall attitudes of both groups, 
journalists and attorneys, more or less concurred. This can 
be attributed to flexibility of both groups - their atti-
tudes may change with their vested interests. For instance, 
if publicity seems to aid the public prosecutor he might be 
inclined to view it favorably. On the other hand he might 
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take a negative attitude towards media rights and take the 
stand that publicity might adversely affect the course of 
justice, if he perceived his interest to be damaged by such 
publicity. It is however, interesting and also encouraging 
to note that journalists have not taken a very strong 
positive attitude; this is borne out by the fact that there 
exists no significant difference with a higher mean scores 
on a number of items, towards the rights of the media. Such 
an attitude may possibly reflect a balanced and fair 
attitude and sense of judgment on the part of journalist in 
general and the respondents to this questionnaire in 
particular. 
Mean attitude scores for between types of groups also 
indicated no significant difference between defense and 
prosecutors. It was inferred that such a result is again 
attributed to the interests of each group, and although they 
sometimes were favorable to the publicity obtained by the 
presence of a camera in the courtroom, they were opposed to 
it when they considered publicity to be counter to their 
interests. The author inferred that attitude towards elec-
tronic coverage among both prosecutors and defense attorneys 
was merely a function of their interest and depended upon 
the individual case (with an overall slightly positive 
attitude). 
Attitudes El. News Effects -
Respondents Interactions 
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The F ratio for interaction between categories of news 
effects and types of personnel is 2.79 at 8 by 224 degrees 
of freedom, and this value is significant at the 0.01 level 
of confidence. Although there were no significant dif-
ferences as indicated by calculated F values for between 
group types and between categories, interaction between 
group types and categories of news effects is significant. 
The interaction effects between attorneys and editors 
in their attitude towards information rights can be broken 
into two sub levels. Those between defense attorneys and 
editors and those between prosecutors and editors. 
Interaction between defense attorneys and editors: 
There is significant difference between the mean scores of 
these two groups as indicated by a gap test. The critical 
difference was evaluated as being equal to 1.54. The 
difference between mean scores for these two groups is 2.22. 
There is no significant difference between the mean 
scores of prosecutors and editors in their attitude to 
information rights. The difference between their mean 
scores on this category is 1.14 and is below the critical 
difference of 1.54. 
It seems that defense attorneys do not share the same 
enthusiasm as do journalists towards the information rights 
which is corollary to the First Amendment. Defense attor-
neys usually have to cope up with sensational and dramatic 
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news about their clients. In most instances these news 
items seem to damage rather than aid the image of their 
clients. Otherwise they may not be sensational at all. 
Therefore, defense attoneys are perhaps less emphatic in 
acknowledging the privileges of the First Amendment. The 
fact that prosecutors' scores do not show any significant 
difference with those of editors' scores can be attributed, 
at least in most instances, to news reports which seem to 
favor the prosecution, or are unfavorable to defense. When 
the state prosecutes, the news value tend to support the 
cause of upholding public justice and therefore is favorable 
to the prosecutors. It must be recognized that the sample 
was small and the statistical significance was due to random 
error phenonmenon. The overall tendency indicated that 
although there was no basic differences in attitude towards 
informational rights there was some differences in the 
intensities of perception of these rights. 
There was no significant difference between attorneys 
and editors in their attitude towards individual rights. 
The writer inferred that all the groups in this study hold 
individual rights as being as important part of the social 
system and have a cohesive and conformist attitude towards 
this aspect of news effect on the individual. 
Implications 
It was not a matter of whether research has indicated a 
more compelling right for one group over the other, because 
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the goal of this study was to indicate ways the groups 
together towards serving the public. 
Both the media and the judiciary must see clearly the 
roles they are to fulfill if society is to remain rational. 
Ultimately someone's freedom will be lost if momentous 
decisions that the media and judiciary must make are left to 
the law to resolve. 
The media in particular must develop its clear sense of 
social responsibility. The Hutchins Commission in 1947 
cited what the alternative would be if the media did not 
develop a clear sense of professional responsibility. It 
stressed that: 
Everyone concerned with freedom of the press 
[media] and with the future of democracy should 
put forth every effort to make the press accoun-
table, for if it does not become so of its own 
motion, the powers of government w~ll be used as a 
last resort, to force it to be so. 
The author believes that freedom carries with it 
obligations and responsibilities, and since the press enjoys 
a privileged position in society, it is obligated to act in 
a responsible manner that will benefit the profession and 
the people that it is supposed to serve. 
On issues like pretrial publicity, in which members of 
the Bar are opposed to some of the methods of the media's 
coverage of court proceedings, the obligations involved are 
many. Reporting or broadcasting a defendant's prior record 
should be weighed and carefully considered; ethnic and 
racial labels should be eliminated, and whether the public 
has an instantaneous need to know must be considered 
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carefully so as not to prejudice the case of the defendant. 
Only a responsible journalist would weigh all the effects of 
such dissemination and arrive at a just conclusion which 
protects his freedom, and the freedom of the accused. 
There is the temptation to follow the traditional path, 
to ask, "Why should my television station, radio station, or 
paper act in such a way, when everyone else is going about 
it the same old way?'' It is difficult, in particular, where 
the responsible journalist tends to lose at the box office. 
But such a problem has always confronted men and women of 
conscience, and the answer always has been the same. It is 
what Atticus Finch told his children in To Kill A 
Mockingbird: "The one thing that doesn't abide by majority 
rule is a person's conscience."3 
Therefore, the leadership of who leads on the right 
path must be borne by the stronger members of the media who 
must show their weaker brethren the path they must trod 
towards maturity. Otherwise, one must face the conse-
quences. The British Jurist Lord Chancellor Hardwicke in 
1742 stated: 
Nothing is more incumbent upon the courts of 
justice, than to preserve their proceedings from 
being misrepresented; nor is there anything of 
more pernicious consequences than to prejudice the 
minds of the public against persons conce4ned as 
parties before the case is finally heard. 
In all aspects, the media be it television, radio, or 
print must be more responsible and alert to its obligations 
and the way and manner in which its functions are executed. 
The media must be willing and ready to solve its own 
problems rather than allow an often hostile judiciary to 
solve the problems for them. 
145 
The unsworn comments of individuals in celebrated 
trials like Hauptmann, Sheppard, and Estes, do not fall 
under the broad umbrella of the First Amendment and the 
"right to know." Although, the public has a right to be 
kept informed of the details as they are testified to during 
a trial in order to fulfill its role of scrutinizing the 
proceedings and ensuring they are consistent with the Sixth 
Amendment, speculative and out-of-courtroom statements 
based upon second or third hand knowledge do not qualify as 
information the public has a right to know. 
The media must strive to disseminate accurate, suffi-
cient and balanced information and to allow the public to 
decide the issues. 
The media must report with maturity. In regards to 
this study reporting should present an examination of 
courtroom proceedings, bring to light judicial misconduct, 
and the abuse of police power, the infringement of a 
defendant's rights, and racial prejudice. 
The findings of this study indicated respondents are 
eager to preserve their Constitutional and individual 
rights. Journalists believed the public should be informed 
of trial events while attorneys believed media coverage 
prejudices and ultimately denies the defendant a fair trial. 
Restraints on media coverage are necessary in some 
cases where immediate dissemination of information may 
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endanger proper administration of justice. Circumstances 
may warrant that the broadcasting or publication of informa-
tion about the accused be delayed in a criminal case. In 
these cases and circumstances, editors and reporters must 
make a "judgment" and decide whether to publish or not. An 
editor must not decide to broadcast or publish because a 
competing station or newspaper intends to broadcast or 
publish. Neither must an editor run senational news stories 
containing prejudicial elements to "scoop" others. 
Journalists must follow a rule of reason in determining 
what is necessary and useful for public disclosure. 
Friendly and Goldfarb believe certain inherent information 
need not be made public: 
Prejudicial characterizations, tendentious and 
peripheral information, juicy tidbits and gratui-
tous judgments by the legal establishment and its 
agent do not fall into the category of data that 
must be immediately made public.5 
Journalists should not perceive the rights to free 
press and fair trial as adverse interests. The two rights 
are mutually interdependent and can co-exist only in an 
atmosphere of mutual understanding between the media and 
members of the Bar. Journalists and members of the Bar must 
understand that the two rights are supportive of each other 
and never intended to be separate and equal in all circum-
stances. 
Recommendations 
The media cannot continue to hide behind the skirts of 
the First Amendment and the Bar cannot continue to plead 
Sixth Amendment rights to justify their transgressions and 
professional malpractices. The following recommendations 
are offered in hope of helping the media create a better 
understaning and promote greater cooperation between the 
media and the Bar. 
Upgraded Standards and Better Curriculum 
for Journalism and Broadcasting Schools 
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The overall structure and curriculum of journalism 
education should be re-examined and upgraded to better serve 
the people. Rather than concentrating on Journalism courses 
alone, students should be given a thorough training in 
liberal arts, the basic sciences, and communication studies 
as a whole. Through such liberal training the students will 
come into reality that his or her society is not the only 
one but there exists various societies with different 
cultures and norms. Students should study the ethical, 
sociological and psychological dimensions of news reporting 
more as well as the techniques of reporting. Journalism 
schools should require students to study proceedings and 
practices leading to and associated directly with ciminal 
and civil trials. 
Trained Specialists for 
Court Reporting 
The media needs to develop specialists in the area of 
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crime and court reporting. A reporter out of journalism 
school should not be assigned to the courthouse beat until 
he can prove a comprehensive understanding of police and 
court procesures and practices. This demands changes in 
journalism school programs and attitudes of those who head 
media organizations. 
Joint Bar - Media Councils 
Bar-press councils are a must and should be developed 
in every locality rather than on a state or national level. 
These councils should be used to foster greater cooperation 
in the monitoring of crime and court coverage in their 
areas. The councils should conduct seminars and symposiums 
exploring electronic coverage of court proceedings in par-
ticular, and the Free Press Fair Trial controvery in 
general. Such events would allow the free exchange of ideas 
and opinions, and create an atmosphere conducive to a better 
understanding of the controversy. 
Commitment by the Media Geared 
Towards Public Education 
Rather than running after the bizzare details and 
sensational aspects of a case, the media must assume an 
effective role in educating the public on how the judicial 
system works. 
Willingness to Hold Certain 
Information 
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The media must restrain themselves in the reporting of 
some cases by withholding the details of a defendant's prior 
record, and aspects of past bizzare behavior not directly 
linked to public safety, until the trial is over or until a 
jury is seated. 
Need for Future Studies 
This study encompassed a very small universe and the 
need for further and continuous research studies in this 
area is mandatory. The author strongly suggests that 
similar studies be conducted in other states and areas with 
a larger number of television editors, reporters and lawyers 
who actually have participated in court televised trials as 
respondents. 
Such studies will help facilitate comparison of atti-
tudes of broadcast journalists and attorneys around the 
nation and help build an overall picture of attitudes toward 
the electronic coverage of court proceedings. 
Future studies need not be limited to television alone 
but should encompass all areas of the broadcast and print 
media affected by Canon 3A (7) of the American Bar Associa-
tion's code of judicial ethics. 
Conclusion 
Canon 35, like many regulations enacted in a time of 
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apparent crisis, appears to have been exaggerated. The 
legal profession's resistance to cameras in courtrooms seems 
to have been born partly of a legitimate concern for 
judicial decorum and the rights of defendants. It also may 
have sprung from a desire to insulate the profession's 
status in society. 
Some occupational sociologists pointed out that esta-
blished professions resist full public scrutiny of their 
work; that it tends to demystify their realm of expertise, 
reduce public respect for the profession and diminish their 
occupational status.6 Electronic coverage of court pro-
ceedings threatened to open the judicial process to the eyes 
and ears of the public and their scrutiny - which it appears 
the Bar does not like. The passage of Canon 35, now Canon 
3A (7), has helped to keep the public largely ignorant of 
the judicial process. 
Times have changed since the Hauptmann, Sheppard, 
Estes, and Irvin trials. Technological advances have 
improved the art of news gathering by the broadcast indus-
try. Some elements of the media ignored the rights of Lee 
Harvey Oswald when he was accused of the death of President 
John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963. However, reporting of 
the attempted assasination of President Ronald Reagan in 
March 1981, and the subsequent pretrial proceedings and 
trial of the accused assassin, John Hinckley, Jr., has been 
commendable. 
1 5 1 
Hurdles will to arise as efforts to open courtrooms to 
electronic coverage. However, they can be overcome by 
promoting greater understanding between the media and the 
Bar, and by stressing the interdependence of the First and 
Sixth Amendments. Wright, former Chief Justice of the 
California State Supreme Court wrote: 
Our entire democratic process depends upon our 
preserving both a strong and free press and an 
independent Judiciary. Without the courts there 
would be no free press, and without a responsible, 
free press we would be unable to maintain a strong 
and effective judicial system.7 
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COPIES OF CORRESPONDENCE 
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Dear Sir: 
1 6 1 
Feyi Ogunduyile 
School of Journalism and Broadcasting 
Oklahoma State University 
Stillwater, Oklahoma 74078 
I am conducting a survey of broadcast editors and 
attorneys in Oklahoma (both prosecutors and defense 
attorneys) on their attitudes toward the electronic coverage 
of court proceedings. I urgently need the valuable help you 
can provide by filling out this opinionnaire. 
The items in the attached opinionnaire deal with an 
issue of public importance. The survey results should 
provide significant and useful information that can help to 
educate the public about this issue. 
The opinionnaire will take no more than 5-10 minutes to 
complete. 
I cannot overemphasize the importance of receiving the 
completed opinionnaire from you as soon as possible. I have 
enclosed a stamped, addressed envelope for your convenience. 
In expressing your opinions check the first response 
that comes to your mind rather than pondering over the item. 
If you have any questions regarding the survey, please do 
not hesitate to telephone me at (405) 372-6725. 
Thank you very much for your cooperation in responding 
to this opinionnaire. 
Sincerely, 
Feyi Ogunduyile 
Candidate for the Master of Science 
Degree in Mass Communication 
Dear Sir: 
162 
Feyi Ogunduyile 
School of Journalism and Broadcasting 
Oklahoma State University 
Stillwater, Oklahoma 74078 
By now you must have received my previous letter 
requesting your participation in a study dealing with the 
electronic coverage of courtroom trials. 
To date I have not received the completed opinionnaire 
from you. Would you please return the copy as early as 
possible. A self addressed stamped envelope with another 
copy of the opinionnaire is enclosed to facilitate quick 
return. 
tion. 
The success of this study depends upon your coopera-
Sincerely, 
Feyi Ogunduyile 
Candidate for the Master of Science 
Degree in Mass Communications 
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NOTE: The purpose of this opinionnaire is to obtain 
your opinions regarding the issue of electronic coverage of 
eoi:irt proceedings (cameras in courtrooms). Please check the 
first response that comes to mind rather than pondering over 
the item. There are no right or wrong answers. 
Please indicate your degree of agreement or disagree-
ment with a check ( ) mark in the appropriate space. 
Check the midpoint if you do not have an opinion on a 
given item. THANK YOU. 
1. The presumption that television coverage of courtroom 
proceedings is biased and prejudicial is based on 
conjecture rather than fact. 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
2. Previous causes of sensational publicity justify banning 
electronic media (television) coverage of courtroom 
proceedings. 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
3. Television coverage of court trials serves to allay 
public fears and dispel rumors during trials. 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
4. Television coverage of court proceedings helps educate 
the public on what happens in a courtroom. 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
5. Television coverage of a trial singles out the defendant 
and adversely prejudices his case. 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
6. Television coverage reinforces the principle that a 
defendant is innocent until proven guilty. 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
7. Witnesses are reluctant to testify because of fears of 
publicity created by television coverage. 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
8. Television coverage of trials serves the cause of 
justice motivates witnesses to come forward to testify. 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
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9. Television coverage of a trial denies the defendant a 
fair trial. 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
10. Fair trials are possible without placing restraints 
upon television coverage. 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
11. Television coverage of courtroom proceedings has no 
significant influence on jurors as often claimed. 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
12. The presence of television cameras in the courtroom 
influences jurors by emphasizing the notoriety of the 
trial. 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
13. Both defense and prosecuting attorneys, during tele-
vised trials, tend to show off for television cameras 
rather than concentrate on the case. 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
14. Television coverage of trials should be banned. 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
15. Barring television cameras from the courtroom violates 
the television's First Amendment rights. 
16. Television should be granted unlimited access to all 
judicial proceedings. 
17. Television coverage of a trial provides a more balanced 
and complete account of a court trial than other media. 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
18. Television coverage of trial over dramatizes and gives 
the public a wrong impression of what actually takes 
place in a trial. 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
PLEASE CHECK APPROPRIATE ITEM: 
Present Position: 1) Editor 
2) Prosecuting Attorney 
3) Defense Attorney 
Years served in Present Position: 
1) Three years or less 
2) More than Three years 
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TABLE SHOWING STATES PERMITTING 
TELEVISION IN THEIR COURTROOMS 
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State 
Alabama 
Alaska 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
Californ~a 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
D.C. 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Louisiana7 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota6 
Missippi 
Missouri 
Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
New York6 
North Carolina 
North Dakota 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania6 
TABLE IV 
STATES PERMITTING TELEVISION 
IN THEIR COURTROOMS 
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Court Where 
Cameras Allowed 
or Proposed 
Consent of 
Type of Defendant Date 
Plan Required 
Trial, Appellate Permanent Yes 2-01-76 
Trial, Appellate Permane·nt Yes1 11-01-79 
Trial, Appellate Experimental No 5-31-79 
Trial, Appellate Experimental Yes 1-01-81 
Trial, Appellate Experimental No 7-01-80 
Trial, Appellate Permanent Yes 2-27-56 
Trial, Appellate Experimental No 4-12-82 
Appellate Experimental No 5-01-82 
None 
Trial, Appellate Permanent No 5-"01-79 
Trial, Appellate Permanent Yes 5-12-77 
Trial, Appellate Pending Yes Pending 
Supreme Court Permanent No 8-27-79 
Trial, Appellate Pending N.S. Pending 
None 
Trial, Appellate Permanent No 1-01-82 
Supreme Court Experimental No 9-14-81 
Trial, Appellate Permanent No 7-01-81 
Trial, Appellate Permanent Yes 7-13-79 
Supreme Court Experimental No 4-02-82 
Trial, Appellate Experimental Yes5 1-01-81 
Trial, Appellate Experimental No 1-01-80 
None 
Appellate Experimental No 1-27-78 
None 
None 
Trial, Appellate Permanent No 4-18-80 
None 
Trial, Appellate Experimental No 4-07-80 
Trial, Appellate Permanent No 1-01-78 
Trial, Appellate Permanent No 10-08-80 
Trial, Appellate Experimental Yes 7-01-80 
Appellate Permanent No 1-01-81 
Trial, Appellate Pending No Pending 
Appellate Permanent No 7-01-80 
Trial, Appellate Permanent No 1-01-82 
Trial, Appellate Permanent Yes2 2-22-82 
None 
Non-Jury Civil Experimental Yes1 10-01-79 
Trial 
State 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
Court Where 
Cameras Allowed 
or Proposed 
Type of 
Plan 
Consent of 
Defendant Date 
Required 
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Rhode Island Trial, Appellate Experimental No 9-01-81 
South Carolina None 
South Dakota Trial, Supreme Pending Yes Pending 
Court 
Tennessee Trial, Appellate Permanent Yes 2-22-79 
Texas None3 
Utah None4 
Vermont6 None 
Virginia None 
Washington Trail, Appellate Permanent Yes1 9-20-76 
West Virginia Trial, Appellate Permanent No 5-07-81 
Wiscons~n Trial, Appellate Permanent No 7-01-79 
Wyoming Supreme Court Experimental No 8-14-81 
1coverage of objecting parties is not permitted. 
Other coverage is allowed. 
2rn civil trials, coverage of parties other than 
objecting defendant is allowed. 
3Audio taping of appellate proceedings is allowed. 
4still photography is allowed. 
Sunless defendant is a government official or entity. 
6Liberalization of existing coverage being 
considered. 
1statute allows coverage if all parties consent, but 
the state Supreme Court has ruled that reproductions may 
only be shown in schools. 
N.S.: Not Specified 
Source: "Cameras in the Courts," Broadcasting (July, 
1982), p. 48. 
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